Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home

Abstract

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)

Politics and Income Taxes: Progress and Progressivity

“…how many swing voters are present in a segment of the electorate). Generalizing this insight, Bierbrauer et al (2022) show that political economy forces can be captured by specific generalized social welfare weights that emerge in the political process. Interestingly, they show that their political equilibrium outcomes may be incompatible with the maximization of a standard concave social welfare function; the generalized social welfare weights of Saez and Stantcheva (2016) are therefore needed.…”

“…There is an interesting relationship between Saez and Stantcheva (2016) and Bierbrauer, Tsyvinski and Werquin (2022). Bierbrauer et al (2022) develop a probabilistic voting model of political competition in which the parties' platform choices (tax policies) and the voters' participation in elections (turnout) are jointly determined in equilibrium.…”

“…There is an interesting relationship between Saez and Stantcheva (2016) and Bierbrauer, Tsyvinski and Werquin (2022). Bierbrauer et al (2022) develop a probabilistic voting model of political competition in which the parties' platform choices (tax policies) and the voters' participation in elections (turnout) are jointly determined in equilibrium. Traditionally, equilibria in probabilistic voting models are akin to maximizing welfare functions with weights reflecting the potential for a party to attract a segment of the electorate (e.g.…”

On the Political and Economic Determinants of Redistribution: Economic Gains, Ideological Gains, or Institutions?

“…Campante (2011) argues that campaign contributions can reduce taxes, and Karabarbounis (2011) defends that high-income voters have more influence in the political process through campaign contributions and higher turnout. Bierbrauer et al (2022) also shows that voter turnout can affect the level of redistribution.…”

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