“…There is a long and well-described tradition of the TI to use the threat of the illicit trade to compromise such evidence-based policies as tobacco tax and price regulations [ 5 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 ], plain packaging [ 32 , 53 ], pictorial warnings [ 49 ], point-of-sale display bans [ 49 ], marketing regulations [ 54 ], flavour bans [ 49 , 55 ], pack size restrictions [ 56 ]. TI in particular often claims that taxes on tobacco products drive the illicit trade [ 5 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 ], although there is a vast amount of evidence showing a limited relationship between higher tobacco prices and size of the illicit market [ 14 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 ].…”