Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Poor heath, large acute and long-term care medical expenses and spousal death are significant drivers of impoverishment among retirees. We document these facts and build a rich overlapping generations model that reproduces them. We use the model to assess the incentive and welfare effects of U.S. Social Security and means-tested social insurance programs, such as Medicaid and food stamp programs, for the aged. We find that U.S. means-tested social insurance programs for retirees provide significant welfare benefits for all newborn. Moreover, when means-tested social insurance benefits are of the scale in the U.S., all newborn prefer that Social Security be removed. Finally, we find that the current scale of means-tested social insurance in the U.S. is about right in the following sense. If we condition on the current Social Security program, the benefits of increasing means-tested social insurance are small or negative.

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“…In the data, some high income household are eligible for Medicaid under this path and have reduced OOP expenses as a result. 16 …”

Section: Medicaid Take-up Rates and Flowsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Old, Sick, Alone, and Poor: A Welfare Analysis of Old-Age Social Insurance Programmes

Braun¹,

Kopecky²,

Koreshkova³

2016

Review of Economic Studies

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“…Noticing that we can write (τ i ) = P i W i , this condition is simply equivalent to τ i (1 + t) = P i W i , which can be replaced into the budget constraint to obtain the equilibrium relation between the tax and the subsidy rates, that is, t = κ/(1 − κ). The zero-profit condition, together with this value of t, yields the optimal level of training: Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) show, in their calibration of the effects of tax changes in the United States, that, although gender-based taxes improve welfare and are preferred by a majority of households, welfare gains are higher under a proportional, gender-neutral income tax. Interestingly, our reasoning in favor of neutral-gender subsidies also echoes some of Saint-Paul (2007)'s arguments against gender-based taxation 22.…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…21 21 Moreover, Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) show, in their calibration of the effects of tax changes in the United States, that, although gender‐based taxes improve welfare and are preferred by a majority of households, welfare gains are higher under a proportional, gender‐neutral income tax. Interestingly, our reasoning in favor of neutral‐gender subsidies also echoes some of Saint‐Paul (2007)'s arguments against gender‐based taxation …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On Gender Gaps and Self‐fulfilling Expectations: Alternative Implications of Paid‐for Training

Dolado¹,

Garcı́a-Peñalosa²,

Rica

2012

Economic Inquiry

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This paper presents a model of self‐fulfilling expectations by firms and households which generates multiplicity of equilibria in pay and housework time allocation for ex‐ante identical spouses. Multiplicity arises from statistical discrimination exerted by firms in the provision of paid‐for training to workers, rather than from incentive problems in the labor market. Employers' beliefs about differences in spouses' reactions to housework shocks lead to symmetric (ungendered) and asymmetric (gendered) equilibria. We find that: (1) the ungendered equilibrium tends to prevail as aggregate productivity in the economy increases (regardless of the generosity of family aid policies), (2) the ungendered equilibrium could yield higher welfare under some scenarios, and (3) gender‐neutral job subsidies are more effective that gender‐targeted ones in removing the gendered equilibrium. (JEL J16, J70, J71)

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“…4 The article is also related to literatures on home production (Greenwood et al, 1995;Gronau, 1997), quantitative macromodels of marriage (Fernandez et al, 2005;Knowles, 2007), and estimated micromodels (Wong, 2003;Jacquemet and Robin, 2011). Also related is work on the effect of tax codes on marriage (Alm and Whittington, 1999;Chade and Ventura, 2002;Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2012;Guner et al, 2012). Other related research is surveyed by Rupert (2008), Siow (2008), and Chiappori and Donni (2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Marriage, Markets, and Money: A Coasian Theory of Household Formation

Burdett

Sun

et al. 2016

Int Economic Review

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This article integrates search‐based models of marriage and money. We think about households as organizations, the way Coase thinks about firms, as alternatives to markets that become more attractive when transactions costs increase. In the model, individuals consume market‐ and home‐produced goods, and home production is facilitated by marriage. Market frictions, including taxes, search, and bargaining problems, increase the marriage propensity. The inflation tax encourages marriage because being single is cash intensive. Microdata confirm singles use cash more than married people. We use macrodata over many countries to investigate how marriage responds to inflation, taxation, and other variables.

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Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Cited by 41 publications

References 23 publications

Old, Sick, Alone, and Poor: A Welfare Analysis of Old-Age Social Insurance Programmes

Old, Sick, Alone, and Poor: A Welfare Analysis of Old-Age Social Insurance Programmes

On Gender Gaps and Self‐fulfilling Expectations: Alternative Implications of Paid‐for Training

Marriage, Markets, and Money: A Coasian Theory of Household Formation

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