Teacher Competence as Practical Rationality^*

Abstract

I.I wish to examine a single thesis formulated in response to a single practical problem. The problem is to identify what competencies are required of a successful teacher in instruction. The thesis is that the competencies needed are simply those that, within moral restrictions, are required for a teacher to change the truth value of the premises of the practical argument in the mind of the child. This thesis is frought with difficulties. Clearly, it rests upon some conception of the inference of a practical argument. But it rests also on some view of the relation between practical reasoning and action. It requires furthermore that we clarify a large number of questions belonging to the theory of explanation. But the nature of practical inference, explanation, and action are perhaps the three most problematic areas of contemporary philosophical reflection. It seems then that my thesis must share in all the uncertainties of these other areas of thought.I remind you, however, that I propose this thesis in response to a practical problem. How can we identify the competencies needed by a successful teacher in instruction? It does not seem to me obvious that to answer this question I need a rationally satisfying, and complete theory of instruction. We do not need a thorough and consistent theory of action in order to develop a satisfactory plan of action. I do not need a satisfactory moral theory in order to decide that I ought to do x, or that I ought to forebear doing y. In fact we are presented with questions of moral theory precisely because the decisions that we ordinarily make independently of such a theory are inconsistent and sometimes do not fit our normal moral consciousness. We are then puzzled and look for some consistent standard or set of principles. Similarly, in the continuing debate about the nature of practical inference, no one doubts that there are such inferences. We can agree that we do not understand that kind of inference only if we already agree that there are some and that we can roughly identify them.

The use of practical arguments in clarifying and changing practical reasoning and classroom practices: two cases

“…The recent literature within education on practical arguments (Green 1976, Fenstermacher 1986, Hamilton 1989, Morine-Dershimer 1987, Pendlebury 1990, Fenstermacher and Richardson 1993, Munby 1984, Russell 1987, Buchmann 1987 is provocative but incomplete. In particular, there has been no elaboration on the role of the Other in theory or in practice, nor has a process for reconstructing teachers' practical arguments been specifically described (although, see Richardson 1993, Morgan 1993).…”

Teachers’ perceptions of students’ mathematical work while making conjectures: an examination of teacher discussions of an animated geometry classroom scenario

“…Teachers' perceptions of their students are part of that rationality; those perceptions are expected to inform the decisions teachers make in instruction Green, 1976). Practical rationality is a general expression that covers experiences, knowledge, perceptions, and judgments that are shared among teachers of similar courses of study, such as algebra, geometry, or calculus.…”

Alternative To Failure : A Junior High School Language Development-Based Curriculum

“…The goal is for all parties involved to develop a description of what is being done and reasons for these actions and procedures. The description produces a series of premises that serve as the basis of practical arguments (Green, 1976). The interacting colleagues inquire about the &dquo;truth value&dquo; of premises that have been formulated, which encourages reconsideration of a premise.…”