Team incentives and leadership

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated by a team leader. Our experiment examines these mechanisms in both homogeneous teams, where workers have identical productivities and in heterogeneous teams, where workers vary in their productivity. Our results are robust to whether teams are homogeneous or heterogeneous. We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader, they tend to restrict the leader's power to distributing less than half of the pie.

Effort reduction of employer‐to‐employer changers: Empirical evidence from football

“…Or alternatively speaking, finding even small significant effort deviations caused by SOCs in such a highly transparent job profile seems to be an indication to conclude that the effect should be significant and more relevant in less transparent jobs resulting in a significant reduction of team productivity. As a practical implication, employers outside the sports industry should intensify the monitoring of their employees' effort decisions after an SOC announcement (e.g., giving more attention to effort statistics or improve monitoring practices) so that they have better opportunities to avoid shirking behavior by offering monetary or nonmonetary incentives (Drouvelis, Nosenzo, & Sefton, ; Goldsmith et al, ). However, strong increases of the employees' monitoring might be negatively (e.g., missing trust) perceived by them, which in return could lead to a crowding out effect of their motivation (Frey & Jegen, ; James, ).…”

Property Rights, Owner-Management, and Value Creation

“…Egocentrism poses a hazard to stakeholders because it may cause owner-managers to favor self-regarding over other-regarding interests (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). The problem of egocentrism for economic value creation is that the owner-manager's pursuit of selfregarding interests can make it difficult for the owner-manager to reach win-win agreements with stakeholders (Drouvelis, Nosenzo, & Sefton, 2017). Barney (2018: 3319) points to this hazard when arguing the following:…”

Incentivizing provision of collective goods: Allocation rules

“…Drouvelis et al . (2017) examine a similar team‐production setting where the nonleader members vote on how much of team output to make available to the leader for allocation. They find that overall team production increases in the team leader treatment compared to the revenue‐sharing treatment.…”

“…The primary research question addressed in our study centers on the flexibility in allocation rules available to the third party tasked with allocating the collective good to group members. Prior experimental research has shown that third party allocators can lead to increased provision of the collective good (Stoddard et al ., 2014; Drouvelis et al ., 2017). However, as discussed in the next section, these studies vary in several dimensions from ours.…”