Technocratic or democratic interest representation? How different types of information affect lobbying success

Flöthe, Linda

doi:10.1057/s41309-019-00051-2

Cited by 22 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…However, the question remains: which groups are better in the provision of expert information? Du¨r et al (2015) argued that financial means allow for delivering exchange goods such as expert information in both a qualitative and a quantitative manner (see also Bernhagen, 2013;Fl€ othe, 2019a). In this way, economic resources make it possible to professionalise as an organisation.…”

Section: Media Salience Moderating the Effect Of Economic Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to RDT, an organisation – whether it is an interest group or a government – is not self-sufficient and must rely on its environment to sustain itself (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Applied to political decision-making, RDT suggests that decision-makers are dependent on external organisations and rely on expert information from third parties in order to design and implement effective and feasible policies (Bouwen, 2004; Braun, 2012; Flöthe, 2019a). As a result, policymakers must interact with their environment to avoid designing and implementing policies with negative unanticipated consequences.…”

Section: Media Salience Moderating the Effect Of Economic Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Influence, affluence and media salience: Economic resources and lobbying influence in the European Union

Stevens

Bruycker

2020

European Union Politics

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This paper evaluates the circumstances under which affluent interest groups wield influence over policy outcomes. Interest group scholarship is ambiguous about the beneficial role of economic resources for lobbying influence. Economically resourceful groups are often presumed to provide more and better expert information to decision-makers and, in exchange, receive more favourable policy concessions. We argue that the beneficial role of economic resources is contingent on the media salience of policy dossiers. We expect that resourceful groups are more influential when issues are discussed behind the public scenes, while their competitive advantage dampens once issues grow salient in the news media. We test our expectations in the context of European Union policymaking, drawing from 183 expert surveys with lobbyists connected to a sample of 41 policy issues. Our empirical findings demonstrate that economic resources matter for lobbying influence, but that their effect is conditional on the media salience of policy issues.

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Section: Media Salience Moderating the Effect Of Economic Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Media Salience Moderating the Effect Of Economic Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Influence, affluence and media salience: Economic resources and lobbying influence in the European Union

Stevens

Bruycker

2020

European Union Politics

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“…Elected leaders need technical knowledge to make decisions (see Flöthe, 2019). Governments listen to a diverse group of experts that includes public or private research units and think tanks (Campbell & Pedersen, 2015;Rosenthal & 't Hart, 1991).…”

Section: Expertsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics, pandemics, and support: the role of political actors in Dutch state aid during COVID-19

Sullivan

Wolff

2021

Rev. Adm. Pública

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How do governments distribute resources across economic sectors during a crisis? And why do some sectors receive more than others? The recent COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the urgency of these questions. In this paper, we explore the extent to which a political economy perspective can help explain the characteristics of sector-specific state aid in the Netherlands, a traditionally corporatist country. While KLM, the biggest player in the Dutch aviation sector, was promised loans worth €3.4 billion, the horeca (hospitality) sector was denied a similar deal. Limited cross-case analysis eliminates purely economic accounts. We employed process-tracing and analyzed hundreds of national media articles to understand the influence of elected leaders, interest groups, and experts. We find that, against the backdrop of economic concerns, vote-seeking behavior by elected leaders as well as the strength and organization of interest groups influenced how much each sector could expect. Meanwhile, policy-seeking behavior helps explain the form that aid took. Our findings highlight the need to consider fiscal support in political economy terms, even during crises, and to explore the composition of state aid, not just its presence or amount.

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“…Furthermore, the resource exchange model (Bouwen, 2002(Bouwen, , 2004, is based on the assumption that interest groups want to have access to policymakers. Interest groups supply scarce resources, such as expert information (Flöthe, 2019), in order to gain access. Interest group access can be defined as a group entering an arena, passing a threshold controlled by relevant gatekeepers (Binderkrantz, Pedersen and Beyers, 2017).…”

Section: Survival Members Influence and Accessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The concept expertise found in the literature (Gormley, 1986;Bouwen, 2002), is a similar but broader resource than scientific knowledge. Expertise can be both about natural scientific facts as well as the feasibly and economic impact of regulation (De Bruycker, 2016;Flöthe, 2019).…”

Section: Scientific Expertisementioning

confidence: 99%

Persuading the independent: understanding why interest groups engage with EU agencies

Joosen

2021

Int Groups Adv

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What motivates interest groups to engage with European Union (EU) agencies?Authors have recently looked into the interaction between interest groups and these European regulators. This article sets out to discover new explanations for interest group behaviour and to add mechanisms to established explanatory factors by looking at this novel context for interest group literature. It employs an in-depth qualitative study using interviews with high level interest group representatives that interact with the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).A novel finding is that interest groups, specifically business actors, are motivated by preventing reputational threats to the agency. This article therefore extends insights from bureaucratic reputation literature to interest group scholarship. Furthermore, interest groups are motivated by factors found in interest group literature such as influence on regulatory policy, gaining access to venues and appeasing their members. This article aids future research efforts in unravelling why interest groups engage with (EU) regulatory agencies.

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Technocratic or democratic interest representation? How different types of information affect lobbying success

Cited by 22 publications

References 38 publications

Influence, affluence and media salience: Economic resources and lobbying influence in the European Union

Influence, affluence and media salience: Economic resources and lobbying influence in the European Union

Politics, pandemics, and support: the role of political actors in Dutch state aid during COVID-19

Persuading the independent: understanding why interest groups engage with EU agencies

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