Telling Tales of Conformity and Mutual Interests

Abstract

recognized overarching authority to determine who gets what, when, and how. This has resulted in the "global governance" narrative, according to which certain collective norms and practices are perceived to form the basis on which states and nonstate actors interact. 2 In contrast to this "governance" is government, which is seen to dwell more on politics and some kind of binding decisions regarding norms, principles, and procedure. This article analyzes the limits or deficiencies of such liberal normative claims and also intends to shed light on the applicability of international norms at both the international and domestic levels. In this context, the article argues that the liberal order, while very appealing and modest, does not sufficiently explain states' behaviour (especially that of powerful ones) at the international level. Inasmuch as the formation of interdependences, regimes, and transnational organizations are on the ascendency, states (at least for now) continue to hold centrality in world affairs, and powerful states often determine how and to where the power pendulum swings. In fact, much of what goes on in the international system is dominated and controlled by these states, which often determine the extent to which international organizations and other transnational networks influence the system. This phenomenon leads to the marginalization of other states that are expected to be "equal" members of these international organizations. Hence, mutual interest does not often translate into mutual benefits. This, I will argue, is the primary limit of a (neo)liberal international order. "Governance without government" refers to Kenneth Waltz's third image-the condition where there is no arbiter to ensure that there is "real" as opposed to "imagined" conformity to rules, principles, or norms of behaviour. This has implications for "international hierarchy" as well. For the purpose of this discussion, liberal international organizations, institutions, and regimes, all with normative underpinnings, will be used interchangeably. And "liberal" here encompasses regime theory, (neo)liberal institutionalism, and the English school, as well as aspects of constructivism-especially those constructivists who share the ontology of a socially constructed global order (such as Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink). This conglomeration of theories can be problematic but for analytical purposes I insist and will show that all of these theories share common ground. I shall use the European Union to buttress the statist critique and the United Nations global compact to illuminate the ethical challenge of a liberal order.