Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

Johnson, Tim; Smirnov, Oleg

doi:10.1038/s42003-021-02804-9

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 62 publications

(92 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Cooperative behaviour—in which individuals pay a cost to confer a benefit to others—is widely and deeply embedded in human and animal societies alike, and has attracted great research interests in studying the underlying mechanisms of favouring the emergence of cooperation 1 – 15 . Under the prominent metaphor of the prisoner’s dilemma 16 , without additional mechanisms including direct 17 , 18 or indirect reciprocity 19 – 22 , and punishment 23 , 24 , unstructured populations—wherein everyone interacts with everyone else—are known to leave no opportunity for the survival of cooperators 25 , 26 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics of collective cooperation under personalised strategy updates

Meng,

Cornelius,

Liu

et al. 2024

Nat Commun

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Collective cooperation is essential for many social and biological systems, yet understanding how it evolves remains a challenge. Previous investigations report that the ubiquitous heterogeneous individual connections hinder cooperation by assuming individuals update strategies at identical rates. Here we develop a general framework by allowing individuals to update strategies at personalised rates, and provide the precise mathematical condition under which universal cooperation is favoured. Combining analytical and numerical calculations on synthetic and empirical networks, we find that when individuals’ update rates vary inversely with their number of connections, heterogeneous connections actually outperform homogeneous ones in promoting cooperation. This surprising property undercuts the conventional wisdom that heterogeneous structure is generally antagonistic to cooperation and, further helps develop an efficient algorithm OptUpRat to optimise collective cooperation by designing individuals’ update rates in any population structure. Our findings provide a unifying framework to understand the interplay between structural heterogeneity, behavioural rhythms, and cooperation.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics of collective cooperation under personalised strategy updates

Meng,

Cornelius,

Liu

et al. 2024

Nat Commun

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…When the individuals are temporally formed to play the N -person snowdrift game [24] with a group size distributions, a totally cooperative population could occur under the strategy selection implemented by the imitation process [25]. Furthermore, when the individuals could choose a time slot to play the prisoner's dilemma game [1], the cooperative behavior of the whole population with spatial structure will be affected by the various time slots [26,27].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in public goods game in populations of dynamic groups with varying evolution time scales

Xu¹,

Zhang²

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The cooperation in a large population engaging in the Public Goods Game (PGG) is investigated. Agents have two strategies to choose, i.e., to cooperate or to defect. These agents are temporally formed into groups for playing the PGG. The group sizes are randomly distributed and the payoffs obtained by the two-type agents after playing the games are related to the strategy selection implemented by the death-birth process. The time scales between the interactions of the agents and the strategy update are also considered. We find that the frequency of cooperation as a function of the game parameter is greatly affected by the group size distributions and the time scales of the evolutionary dynamics. At some cases, the cooperative behavior can be analytically solved. In this model, a mixed state with coexistence of cooperators and defectors and a totally cooperative state are observed. The critical game parameter, above which a totally cooperative state will occur, is obtained by an analytical treatment or analyzed by the last-surviving pattern. When the process of the strategy selection is fast, the critical game parameter for the emergence of an AllC state depends on the size scope of the group size distribution and the time scale of the interactions via grouping dynamics. At slow strategy selection, the critical game parameter approaches to rely on the mean group size of the dynamically formed groups. All the theoretical results are verified by computer simulations and they are in a good agreement.

show abstract

Fixation probability in evolutionary dynamics on switching temporal networks

Bhaumik,

Masuda

2023

J. Math. Biol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Population structure has been known to substantially affect evolutionary dynamics. Networks that promote the spreading of fitter mutants are called amplifiers of selection, and those that suppress the spreading of fitter mutants are called suppressors of selection. Research in the past two decades has found various families of amplifiers while suppressors still remain somewhat elusive. It has also been discovered that most networks are amplifiers of selection under the birth-death updating combined with uniform initialization, which is a standard condition assumed widely in the literature. In the present study, we extend the birth-death processes to temporal (i.e., time-varying) networks. For the sake of tractability, we restrict ourselves to switching temporal networks, in which the network structure deterministically alternates between two static networks at constant time intervals or stochastically in a Markovian manner. We show that, in a majority of cases, switching networks are less amplifying than both of the two static networks constituting the switching networks. Furthermore, most small switching networks, i.e., networks on six nodes or less, are suppressors, which contrasts to the case of static networks.

show abstract

Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

Cited by 10 publications

References 62 publications

Dynamics of collective cooperation under personalised strategy updates

Dynamics of collective cooperation under personalised strategy updates

Cooperation in public goods game in populations of dynamic groups with varying evolution time scales

Fixation probability in evolutionary dynamics on switching temporal networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About