Temporal spillovers in land conservation

Jacobson, Sarah

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.04.013

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In addition, we summarized different types of financial incentives/disincentives and interactions among BMPs that have been neglected in the literature [80,82,87]. Factors shown to influence conservation adoption, and areas in which research is lacking, are listed in Table 3 and outlined in the following sections.…”

Section: Findings: Factors Influencing Bmp Adoptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other research has focused on the spatial slippage that occurs when conservation programs increase productive farm land scarcity and some less productive land is brought into production temporarily [122][123][124]. Temporal spillover has been examined by studying the impact of adoption of certain BMPs (such as enrollment in a conservation program) on the later adoption of other practices (such as staying in the same conservation program or switching to another program) [80]. She finds that CRP leads to land being 20-25% more likely to be farmed, potentially offsetting some environmental benefits.…”

Section: Interactions Among Bmps and Spatial And Temporal Spillover mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Factors Influencing Farmers’ Adoption of Best Management Practices: A Review and Synthesis

2018

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Best management practices (BMPs) for reducing agricultural non-point source pollution are widely available. However, agriculture remains a major global contributor to degradation of waters because farmers often do not adopt BMPs. To improve water quality, it is necessary to understand the factors that influence BMP adoption by farmers. We review the findings of BMP adoption studies from both developed and developing countries, published after (or otherwise not included in) two major literature reviews from 2007 and 2008. We summarize the study locations, scales, and BMPs studied; the analytical methods used; the factors evaluated; and the directionality of each factor's influence on BMP adoption. We then present a conceptual framework for BMP adoption decisions that emphasizes the importance of scale, the tailoring or targeting of information and incentives, and the importance of expected farm profits. We suggest that future research directions should focus on study scale, on measuring and modeling of adoption as a continuous process, and on incorporation of social norms and uncertainty into decision-making. More research is needed on uses of social media and market recognition approaches (such as certificate schemes and consumer labeling) to influence BMP adoption.

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Section: Findings: Factors Influencing Bmp Adoptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Interactions Among Bmps and Spatial And Temporal Spillover mentioning

confidence: 99%

Factors Influencing Farmers’ Adoption of Best Management Practices: A Review and Synthesis

2018

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“…Other enrolled parcels, however, have productive potential and are unlikely to stay in CRP long‐term. Jacobson (2014) found that, compared to similar fields that had never been enrolled in CRP, former CRP fields that were voluntarily removed from the program were 20–25% more likely to be farmed. The authors thus hypothesized that some landowners may use CRP “as a long, subsidized fallow period” (Jacobson, 2014, p.378).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Jacobson (2014) found that, compared to similar fields that had never been enrolled in CRP, former CRP fields that were voluntarily removed from the program were 20–25% more likely to be farmed. The authors thus hypothesized that some landowners may use CRP “as a long, subsidized fallow period” (Jacobson, 2014, p.378). Greater insight is needed into the social and biophysical conditions that prompt landowners to offer agriculturally productive fields for CRP enrollment and the programmatic conditions that lead FSA to grant these fields CRP contracts.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Land use decisions after the Conservation Reserve Program: Re‐enrollment, reversion, and persistence in the southern Great Plains

Barnes

Sketch

Gramza

et al. 2020

Conservat Sci and Prac

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The temperate grasslands of North America remain one of the most modified and threatened ecosystems on the planet. In the United States, the conservation of grassland‐dependent wildlife continues to be challenged by the widespread conversion of privately owned grasslands to cropland. Recent analyses indicate that land exiting the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the country's largest private lands conservation program, is a primary source of grassland conversion. In this mixed‐methods study, we employed focus groups and mail surveys to understand the decisions made by landowners in the southern Great Plains as their CRP contracts near expiration and up to 7 years following expiration. We explored both the post‐contract intentions of landowners with fields currently enrolled in CRP and the self‐reported, post‐contract decisions of landowners whose CRP contracts expired between 2011 and 2017. Interest in re‐enrolling in CRP upon contract expiration was high among landowners with current fields; however, over half of landowners with former CRP fields reported being unable to re‐enroll when they tried. We found higher rates of grassland persistence than have been previously reported, but also detected temporal patterns that suggest that cropland reversion is increasingly likely as the time since contract expiration increases. This study highlights the need for increased attention to the barriers that preclude transition into other conservation programs following CRP and more detailed understanding of what drives landowner decision‐making about re‐enrollment and post‐CRP land use. These insights will be critical for increasing the effectiveness of programs for enduring grassland conservation on private lands.

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“…The literature points to optimal land use models, income growth and demand for forest products, corruption, costly enforcement, illegal logging, and other institutional weaknesses. 8 Alemagi and Kozak (2010) argue that several or 6 The estimated numbers of such leakage vary between 5 and 95 percent, but more typical estimates are around 40 percent (Atmadja and Verchot, 2012;Jacobson, 2014;Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009;Murray, 2008;Murray et al, 2004) . 7 In Nepal, "the Forest Department was poorly sta¤ed and thus unable to implement and enforce the national policies, and deforestation increased in the 1960s and 1970s" (Shyamsundar and Ghate, 2014, pp.85).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

Harstad

Mideksa

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes AbstractMotivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation can be legal or illegal in the model: each district decides how much to protect and how much to extract for sale on a common market. If districts are strong, in that they find protection inexpensive, extraction is sales-driven and districts bene.t if neighbors conserve. If districts are weak, they lose when neighbors conserve since the smaller supply increases the price and the pressure on the resource, and thus also the cost of protection. Consequently, decentralizing authority increases conservation if and only if districts are weak. Contracting with the central authority is socially optimal, but, on the one hand, the donor benefits from contracting with districts if they are weak; on the other hand, districts prefer to decentralize if they are strong. The presence of the donor may lead to a regime change that increases extraction by more than it is reduced by the contract itself.JEL-Code: Q340.

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Temporal spillovers in land conservation

Cited by 17 publications

References 15 publications

Factors Influencing Farmers’ Adoption of Best Management Practices: A Review and Synthesis

Factors Influencing Farmers’ Adoption of Best Management Practices: A Review and Synthesis

Land use decisions after the Conservation Reserve Program: Re‐enrollment, reversion, and persistence in the southern Great Plains

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

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