Much has been written since the early 1980s about the costs of regulation and the various ways to curb them, but thus far no one has examined empirically the rise or decline of other forms of legislation, mainly primary legislation, in the context of the “war on regulation.” This article examines the extent to which the decline in the rate of production of secondary legislation in Israel since 1985 has been driven by changes in the rate of production of primary legislation. Using an original longitudinal data set, we count, codify various dimensions, and compare the type and length of primary and secondary legislations and the number of delegated provisions that primary legislations contain. We find that the relationship between primary and secondary legislation is not hierarchic, as one might have expected, but has become partially substitutive. The decline in the rate of production of secondary legislation in Israel is, perhaps paradoxically, associated with the rise of primary legislation. This opens a new research agenda on the relationships between primary and secondary legislation that goes well beyond the Israeli case.