Temporary Workers are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation

Abstract

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more selfish and contribute less than temporary and permanent workers.

Norms of Punishment: Experiments With Students and the General Population

“…For instance, in a prisoner's dilemma, students cooperate less than white‐collar workers (Bigoni, Casari, and Camera ) or bicycle messengers (Burks, Carpenter, and Goette ). Similarly, students are less prosocial than rural and urban citizens in a public good game (Gächter and Herrmann ), than rural villagers in the appropriation of common‐pool resources (Cardenas ), and than employees in a dictator game (Carpenter, Burks, and Verhoogen ; Dragone, Galeotti, and Orsini ). The gap remains when one compares students and professionals , that is self‐selected subjects with a high degree of expertise who ordinarily deal with situations resembling the experimental task.…”