Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria

Myerson, Roger B.; Weibull, Jörgen W.

doi:10.3982/ecta11048

Cited by 29 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…For related models of social norms, see Young (1993) [34], Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) [35], Sethi and Somanathan (1996) [36], Bicchieri (1997) [37], Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) [38], Huck, Kübler, and Weibull (2012) [39], and Myerson and Weibull (2015) [40]. 4 Our study also complements a large literature on theoretical analyses of the evolution of behaviors in populations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 67%

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists

Alger

Weibull

2017

Games

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Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 67%

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists

Alger

Weibull

2017

Games

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“…(a) There are several game-theoretic models in which the solution concept is a set of strategies rather than a single strategy. In particular, see Basu and Weibull (1991) who (adjusted for the symmetric case) search for minimal sets of strategies for which all best responses to any belief on the set are inside the set (see also the discussion in Myerson and Weibull (2015), p. 950). (c) A player in our model can be thought of as a team in the sense of Marschak and Radner (1972), such that all members share the same target and each is responsible for choosing one characteristic of the team's decision.…”

Section: Comments About the Model And The Solution Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multidimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium, and Applications

Arad

Rubinstein

2019

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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We develop a framework for analyzing multi-dimensional reasoning in strategic interactions, which is motivated by two experimental findings: (a) in games with a large and complex strategy space, players tend to think in terms of strategy characteristics rather than the strategies themselves; (b) in their strategic deliberation, players consider one characteristic at a time. An MD-equilibrium is a vector of characteristics representing a stable mode of behavior: a player does not wish to modify any one characteristic. The concept is applied to several economic interactions, where a vector of characteristics, rather than a distribution of strategies, is identified as stable.* We are thankful to Hadar Binsky, Neta Klein and Hadar Weisman for research assistance and to Yossi Tamarov for building the MD-equilibrium calculator. We are grateful to Kemal Yildiz, Dong Wey and especially Michael Richter for useful comments.

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“…In a similar spirit, other authors have provided behavioral foundations for proper equilibrium. Myerson and Weibull (2015) considered a model in which each player, rather than having its full strategy sets at its disposal, chooses its strategy from a possibly restricted "consideration set" given by nature. Under certain conditions, the projections of the Nash equilibria of these consideration set games converge to the proper equilibria of the original game.…”

Section: Representation Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games

Milgrom¹,

Mollner

2018

Econometrica

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We introduce the test‐set equilibrium refinement of Nash equilibrium to formalize the idea that players contemplate only deviations from equilibrium play in which a single competitor plays a non‐equilibrium best response. We then apply this refinement to three well‐known auction games, comparing our findings to similar ones previously obtained by specialized equilibrium selections. We also introduce a theory of high stakes versions of games, in which strategies are first proposed and then subjected to a potentially costly review‐and‐revise process. We demonstrate a sense in which the test‐set equilibria emerge from such processes when the cost of revision is small.

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Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria

Cited by 29 publications

References 50 publications

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists

Multidimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium, and Applications

Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games

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