Tender offers and stockholder returns

Dodd, Peter; Ruback, Richard S.

doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90043-5

Cited by 427 publications

(184 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Industry-specific empirical research shared some commonalities (Dodd and Ruback, 1977;Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, Jr., 1983;Canina, 2001) while others indicated opposite results (Dodd, 1980;Asquith, 1983;Sheel and Nagpal, 2000;Hsu and Jang, 2006). It is noticeable these studies differ in the sample time periods, definitions of event date, models used to generate abnormal returns, time frames prior to and post merger, payment methods, merger sizes, and merger types.…”

Section: Empirical Results On Abnormal Returnsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Yet previous empirical studies found controversial results on the abnormal returns to the acquirers (Dodd and Ruback, 1977;Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, Jr., 1983;Canina, 2001;Dodd, 1980;Asquith, 1983;Sheel and Nagpal, 2000;Hsu and Jang, 2006;and Yang and Kim, 2007); limited attention has attributed to the abnormal returns and the effect of different transaction media on the gains to the acquirers in the long term.…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Merger abnormal returns and payment methods of hospitality firms

Yang

2009

International Journal of Hospitality Management

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Section: Empirical Results On Abnormal Returnsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Merger abnormal returns and payment methods of hospitality firms

Yang

2009

International Journal of Hospitality Management

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“…It might be expected that hostile takeovers-often tender offers-rather than friendly mergers are triggered by poor performance, but in five studies (Dodd and Ruback 1977;Franks and Mayer 1996;Kini et al 2004;Martin and McConnell 1991;Smiley 1976) on target performance in tender offers, only Smiley finds that targets exhibit significantly negative pre-acquisition performance.…”

Section: Pre-acquisition Performance Of Targetsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

Eichholtz

Kok

2007

J Real Estate Finan Econ

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We investigate 95 takeovers of property companies all over the world and find that only two of those are hostile. To determine the effectiveness of the market for corporate control, we first study characteristics of targets and acquirers compared to a control sample, using the complete global universe of listed property companies during the most recent takeover wave (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004). We find that the inefficient management hypothesis holds for both REITs and non-REITs, as targets exhibit significant underperformance before takeovers. In the second part of this study, we investigate shareholder wealth effects following takeovers and confirm previous findings that abnormal returns for targets and bidders are distinctly different for the real estate sector. Moreover, we show that this difference not only holds for REIT-to-REIT mergers, but also for mergers of real estate firms without a REIT-status.

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“…Among the works which focus on Tender Offers, some of which are illustrated in Table 2, the results are not always converging. Many studies, in fact, seem to suggest the creation of value for the shareholders of the companies involved (Dodd & Ruback, 1977;Kummer & Hoffmeister, 1978;Bradley, 1980;Jarrell & Bradley, 1980;Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988;Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989;Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989, Smith & Kim, 1994Bigelli & Mengoli, 1999). Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) and the results refer only to Tender offers.…”

Section: The Results Of Literature On Tender Offersmentioning

confidence: 99%