Terror Support and Recruitment

Abstract

We analyse a dynamic model linking terrorist activities to popular support through a recruitment mechanism. It is shown that anti-terrorism policies focusing on liberal ideals (reducing repression, increasing economic opportunity) are effective at abating recruitment, thereby affecting the dynamic stability of terrorist attacks. In contrast, deterrence's comparative advantage is in counteracting hard-core members, implying that terror eradication itself requires an emphasis on hard-core membership, rather than popular support for terror activities.Terrorist networks, Anti-terrorist policies, Terrorist recruitment,

A Note on the Effectiveness of National Anti-Terrorist Policies: Evidence from ETA

“…This result, however, should be taken with caution, noting that the access of the Socialists to power has been a consequence of the illegalization of the radical nationalists and the majority of the population in the Basque Country is still nationalist. Herri Batasuna has to be accepted in the parliament with its minority position, signifying that terrorism policies that reduce repression and increase economic opportunity are effective in abating terrorism recruitment and promoting peace (Faria and Arce, 2005).…”

“…Several models of antiterrorism deterrence policies have been proposed in the literature, supported either in game theory (Arce and Sandler, 2005;Rosendorf and Sandler, 2004;Sandler and Siqueira, 2005), or in optimal control theory (Faria and Arce, 2005;Faria, 2006). While these models have been proposed for international terrorism, they can accommodate national terrorism too.…”

“…While these models have been proposed for international terrorism, they can accommodate national terrorism too. According to Faria and Arce (2005), the terrorist organization grows through a process of recruitment from the pool of its supporters due to the popular support enjoyed by the terrorists' cause. For example, Faria (2006) develops a theoretical cat-and-mouse model of the attacks and counter attack process where the government has numerous objectives, including national security and the terrorist groups have a budget constraint that do not enable them to sustain the terrorist campaign indefinitely.…”

Group support for political violence: The role of emotions and expressive choice in creating conflict or providing peace

“…Faria and Arce (2005) analyse the necessity of generating popular support in order to provide a large enough pool of potential recruits. In de Figueiredo and Weingast (2001), suppression by an in-group moves the preferences of moderates within an out-group closer to radicals within the out-group.…”

Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure

“…Articles by Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Faria and Arce (2005) provide formal models of the recruitment process (i.e., the selection of the optimal value of NÞ. In contrast, we treat N as a fixed factor of production so that we can focus on other determinants of the group's optimal density.…”