Terrorist networks, support, and delegation

Siqueira, Kevin; Sandler, Todd

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9487-y

Cited by 23 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Networks are also relevant in a game-theoretic setting to investigate how a global terrorist organization (GTO) delegates local terrorist groups in the field (Siqueira & Sandler, 2010). This delegation decision is based on the GTO’s perceived orientation of the targeted government and the fervor of the local supporters for the terrorist group’s goals.…”

Section: Major New Developments In the Study Of Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The analytical study of terrorism

Sandler¹

2013

Journal of Peace Research

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169

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This article presents an eclectic review of the analytical study of terrorism that views all agents as rational decisionmakers. This analytical literature began in earnest with the seminal study of US skyjackings by William Landes in 1978. After 11 September 2001, the analytical literature on terrorism grew rapidly. Based on policy relevance, my survey article identifies five key areas of intense research interests. These include analyses of terrorist attack trends, the economic consequences of terrorism, the study of counterterrorism effectiveness, the causes of terrorism, and the relationship of terrorism and liberal democracies. New developments in the field focused on distinguishing key differences between domestic and transnational terrorism. Additionally, recent game-theoretic advances permitted more active agents and stages to the games. Other major developments involved the study of networked terrorists and the role of counterterrorism foreign aid. Fruitful future directions include using advanced econometric methods to discern the true impact of terrorism on growth, applying spatial econometrics to the study of terrorism, ascertaining the determinants of terrorist groups’ longevity, and learning how to foster international counterterrorism cooperation.

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Section: Major New Developments In the Study Of Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The analytical study of terrorism

Sandler¹

2013

Journal of Peace Research

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169

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“…A few studies have explored relationships between terrorist groups using social network concepts, showing that connections help groups become more lethal and learn new tactics (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008;Horowitz 2010;Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer 2012;Horowitz and Potter 2013). Other important research has studied terrorist groups' relationships without explicitly drawing on network theory (Bloom 2005;Karmon 2005;Siqueira and Sandler 2010).…”

Section: Terrorist Organizations Cooperation and Group Longevitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity

Phillips

2013

Int Stud Q

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Why do some terrorist groups survive considerably longer than others? The literature is just beginning to address this important question in a systematic manner. Additionally, and as with most studies of terrorism, longevity studies have ignored the possibility of interactions between terrorist groups. This article attempts to address these two gaps in the literature: the incomplete understanding of terrorist group survival and the tendency to assume that terrorist groups act independently. In spite of risks associated with cooperation, I argue that it should help involved terrorist groups mitigate mobilization concerns. More importantly, the impact of cooperation is conditioned by attributes of the country in which a terrorist group operates. Using new global data on terrorist groups between 1987 and 2005, I show that cooperation has the strongest effect on longevity in states where groups should have a harder time operating-more capable states and less democratic states. Interestingly, a group's number of relationships is more important than to whom the group is connected.

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“…The sponsors of transnational terrorist groups-whether they are states or other actorsworry that their agents will "shirk" and avoid engaging in acts of violence that place them in danger of being captured or killed. To prevent shirking, sponsors select as agents groups and individuals who are most committed to the use of violence and least interested in compromise and cooperation with the target country (see Bueno de Mesquita 2005;Shapiro 2013;Siqueira and Sandler 2010). This means that opposition to cooperation is hardwired into the terrorist group.…”

Section: Downloaded By [Suny Health Science Center] At 16:04 04 Aprilmentioning

confidence: 99%