2018
DOI: 10.1177/0964663918793169
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Testimonial Injustice and Vulnerability: A Qualitative Analysis of Participation in the Court of Protection

Abstract: This article explores participation in Court of Protection (COP) proceedings by people considered vulnerable. The paper is based on original data obtained from observing COP proceedings and reviewing COP case files. It is argued that the observed absence of the subject of proceedings is a form of testimonial injustice, that is, a failure to value a person in their capacity as a giver of knowledge. The issue of competence to give evidence is considered but it is argued that it is not the formal evidential rules… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Such concerns might reflect status-based assumptions about the inherent psychological and epistemic vulnerabilities of people with mental illness and intellectual disabilities by those without lived experience of such conditions. 23 , 24 For instance, respondents did not express any concerns about potential emotional distress from discussing disturbing memories and topics while drafting a self-binding directive, and concerns about undue influence, or about self-binding directives hampering clinical judgment, were raised in only 12 responses. Respondents appeared ready and able to articulate details about their illness and its effects on their thinking and decision making, and to understand these effects with great insight and clarity.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such concerns might reflect status-based assumptions about the inherent psychological and epistemic vulnerabilities of people with mental illness and intellectual disabilities by those without lived experience of such conditions. 23 , 24 For instance, respondents did not express any concerns about potential emotional distress from discussing disturbing memories and topics while drafting a self-binding directive, and concerns about undue influence, or about self-binding directives hampering clinical judgment, were raised in only 12 responses. Respondents appeared ready and able to articulate details about their illness and its effects on their thinking and decision making, and to understand these effects with great insight and clarity.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In some cases, P was said to be unfit to attend the court and this was specifically acknowledged in the judgment, for example in King's College Hospital v C, para 58: “I have not had the opportunity to meet C. She is too ill to attend court and given the need for an urgent decision to be made in this case there has not been time to arrange for me to attend hospital to meet with her.” However, in other cases it is not clear whether any specific consideration had, in fact, been given to the question of whether P should speak directly to the judge (either at court or by the judge visiting them). In her recent qualitative analysis of participation, based on observation of Court of Protection proceedings and reviewing Court of Protection files, Lindsey argues that P's absence from proceedings is a form of injustice, underpinned by the persistent stereotyping of mentally disabled adults as inherently vulnerable (Lindsey, 2018).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bell, 2014; Bourgault, 2020; Doan, 2017; Iacono, 2017; Lee et al, 2019) have used the concepts of epistemic injustice more than have their counterparts in sociolegal studies (compare, e.g. Lindsey, 2019; Tsosie, 2012). Although theorists still debate how best to identify or characterize the harms of testimonial injustice (see, e.g.…”
Section: Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%