Testimonial Injustice in International Criminal Law

Fyfe, Shannon

doi:10.5840/symposion20185213

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Our findings highlight the significance of the issue: close to one-third of insiders called by the ICTR and almost half of those called by the ICC were deemed seriously lacking in credibility and reliability and thus were either dismissed, used in a limited manner or used only if corroborated. This high rate counteracts the assumption held by some observers that ‘international courts are often willing to give international witnesses the benefit of the doubt with respect to meeting relevance and credibility requirements’ (Fyfe, 2018: 163), at least as far as it relates to insider witnesses.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…First and foremost, they were mentioned with such low frequency that it was difficult to account for them in the calculations overall. Hence, although international criminal justice researchers highlight the potential for cross-cultural mistakes and issues with trauma and witness memory (Fyfe, 2018; Zahar, 2010), or even claim that serious testimonial deficiencies or lying are attributed ‘to innocent causes that do not impact the witness’s credibility’ (Combs, 2010: 189), it appears that such excuses are disregarded in relation to insiders. This relative disdain towards competence factors demonstrates a lack of attention to witnesses’ background and experiences and a rather narrow focus on obtaining information useful for ascertaining the facts of the case.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Suspicious minds? Empirical analysis of insider witness assessments at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC

Chlevickaite

Holá

Bijleveld

2021

European Journal of Criminology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The testimonies of insider witnesses are often key to prosecutions of international crimes, despite significant trustworthiness concerns. However, we know little about the practice of judicial assessments of insider testimonies, that is, which factors the judges consider relevant to relying on insider testimony. With this article, we set out to provide a comprehensive, explorative examination of the insider witness assessment factors used by the trial judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court in 1996–2019. By using multiple correspondence analysis, we show that the factors related to insider witness assessment outcomes are generally similar across the tribunals and tend to focus on the contents of the testimonies, with less attention given to credibility or competence concerns. This research constitutes the first systematic quantitative analysis and cross-institutional comparison of insider witness assessment practice at an international level.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Suspicious minds? Empirical analysis of insider witness assessments at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC

Chlevickaite

Holá

Bijleveld

2021

European Journal of Criminology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Abandoning the use of testimonial injustice as a useful concept in individual instances has other theoretical consequences. The concept has been applied in contexts as varied as psychiatry (Kurs and Grinshpoon 2017), medicine (Carel and Kidd 2014), law (Fyfe 2018), and education (Kotzee 2013). We do not deny the usefulness of the concept in these areas, as long as it is used as a steppingstone towards changing the toxic circumstances in which many testimonial exchanges arise.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter

Arcila-Valenzuela

Páez

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.

show abstract

“…El potencial crítico del concepto de injusticia testimonial para el análisis de las transacciones epistémicas que ocurren en el contexto judicial se puede ver no solo en los ejemplos trabajados originalmente por Miranda Fricker (2007), 4 sino también en otros estudios que enfocan el mundo jurídico. El tema fue objeto de consideración por Hock Lai Ho (2012) con respecto a la filosofía del derecho probatorio, pero podemos destacar estudios más recientes: Fyfe (2018) se vuelve al contexto del derecho criminal internacional; Townsend & Townsend (2021) se dedican a discutir el tema de los daños epistémicos (testimoniales y hermenéuticos) que sufren los indígenas en el contexto del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos; Jennifer Lackey (2021Lackey ( , 2022Lackey ( y 2023, José Medina (2021) y Janaina Matida (2020) discuten la injusticia testimonial por exceso de credibilidad en los casos de confesiones falsas y reconocimiento 3 Aquí se nota que Fricker adopta una perspectiva evidencialista con respecto a las razones que justifican creer en el testimonio de alguien. Para una crítica, véase Jennifer Lackey (2018).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

¿Existen injusticias hermenéuticas en el derecho?

Herdy

Castelliano

2023

Rev. Bras. Dir. Proc. Penal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Este artículo discute la aplicación del concepto de injusticia hermenéutica (Miranda Fricker, 2007) en contextos judiciales. Se argumenta que la aplicación de este concepto para capturar los problemas de la ininteligibilidad judicial de experiencias marginadas no es tan claramente discernible. Hay un obstáculo para su aplicación al derecho cuando se analizan los elementos que, según Fricker, componen la definición de injusticia hermenéutica. Más específicamente, su carácter puramente estructural no encaja muy bien con una perspectiva realista de la actividad de interpretación judicial. Desde esa perspectiva, los intérpretes judiciales tienen un papel decisivo en la evitación o creación de lagunas hermenéuticas. Más allá del componente agencial de la injusticia hermenéutica judicial, se argumenta que la intencionalidad del intérprete judicial es, en cierto sentido, peculiar –lo que es particularmente evidente en los casos penales–. La conclusión de este artículo es que la injusticia hermenéutica judicial desdibuja la línea entre las dimensiones estructural y agencial de la injusticia hermenéutica, de modo que la definición de Fricker es solo parcialmente útil para el derecho.

show abstract

Testimonial Injustice in International Criminal Law

Cited by 4 publications

References 4 publications

Suspicious minds? Empirical analysis of insider witness assessments at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC

Suspicious minds? Empirical analysis of insider witness assessments at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC

Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter

¿Existen injusticias hermenéuticas en el derecho?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About