Testimony amidst Diversity

Abstract

This chapter takes up the question of what (if anything) might be wrong with religious beliefs that are held primarily on the basis of testimony, in light of the facts of religious diversity. The chapter first considers whether religious diversity entails that a religious believer’s testimony-based beliefs are not formed in a suitably epistemically reliable manner even conditional upon the truth of her religion. After casting doubt on this thought the chapter turns to look at the idea that testimony-based beliefs are subject to defeaters in light of awareness of religious diversity, and suggests that many such beliefs are not obviously so. According to the author’s diagnosis the problem, rather, is that believers who base their religious beliefs just on testimony will be very unlikely to have reflective (that is, second-order) knowledge even if they possess first-order knowledge, and the author explains why this is a notable shortcoming.

Divine hiddenness, the demographics of theism, and mutual epistemic dependence: a response to Max Baker-Hytch

“…As mentioned previously, Baker-Hytch (2016) has tried to cast doubt on (D) by appealing to MED. MED refers to the fact that humans are cognitively constituted in such a way that it is a practical necessity that we rely upon testimony for much of what we know about the world and in such a way, moreover, that we are liable to be significantly influenced by what those around us believe, particularly when it comes to matters that aren't readily susceptible to empirical investigation, including religious matters.…”

“…Now Baker-Hytch grants that MED is not very surprising given naturalism. 4 So to cast doubt on (D), he attempts to show that MED is fairly unsurprising on theism. He argues that if God exists and creates a world with embodied personswhich, following Swinburne (2004), we might believe God has good reason to dothen God has good reason to bestow these embodied persons with the sort of cognitive constitution humans have.…”

Kitartó keresztény hit, részrehajló episztemikus mércék és a disszenzus kihívásai

“…32 Másrészt vannak olyan vitatott kérdések, mint amilyen a keresztény hit igazsága is, amelyekkel kapcsolatban bármilyen tartalmú és szilárdságú álláspontot formálunk, lesznek olyan függetlenül episztemikusan nem lefokozható társaink, akik szerint tévedünk. Nincs hova 30 Baker-Hytch 2018, 192. 31 Plantinga 1995Bernáth -Tőzsér 2022, 325.…”