1997
DOI: 10.1080/00048409712347771
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Testimony, induction and folk psychology

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Cited by 80 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…Reductionist views hold that the justification of beliefs based on testimony is not special to testimony, but rather relies on the independent justifiability of beliefs based on perception, memory, or inductive inference. Reductionists in this sense include Hume (1972), Fricker (1994Fricker ( , 1995, Lipton (1998), andLyons (1997). Non-reductionists maintain that acceptance of testimony is justified in itself, unless there is some reason to think that the testimony is false.…”
Section: The Justification Of Testimony-based Beliefmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reductionist views hold that the justification of beliefs based on testimony is not special to testimony, but rather relies on the independent justifiability of beliefs based on perception, memory, or inductive inference. Reductionists in this sense include Hume (1972), Fricker (1994Fricker ( , 1995, Lipton (1998), andLyons (1997). Non-reductionists maintain that acceptance of testimony is justified in itself, unless there is some reason to think that the testimony is false.…”
Section: The Justification Of Testimony-based Beliefmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The epistemology that she develops is (as she herself emphasizes) well-supported by our "common sense" about testimony: it might even be viewed as a refinement of that common sense; and it is thus of broad appeal. A number of other authors (e.g., Henderson 2008, who cites, in addition to Fricker, Adler 1994, Faulkner 2000, and Lyons 1997 have in fact proposed similar views about the relative merits of monitoring and blind trust. Fricker's particular epistemology of testimony thus serves as a representative of a family of related, intuitively plausible epistemologies; the argument of the paper has implications for this family as a whole.…”
Section: Monitoring and Blind Trust In The Epistemology Of Testimonymentioning
confidence: 91%
“…12 Proponents of different versions of reductionism include Hume (1967) and Fricker (1987Fricker ( , 1994Fricker ( , 1995. For a variant of this approach, see Lyons (1997). For a nice discussion of Hume's version of reductionism, see Root (2001 Audi (1997, p. 415).…”
Section: IVmentioning
confidence: 97%