Testing Spatial Models of Elections: The Influence of Voters and Elites on Candidate Issue Positions

Abstract

This research tests spatial models of electoral competition using survey data on state legislative candidates' policy positions and ideology in eight U.S. states. Our data support several hypotheses: 1) candidates' issue positions do not converge; 2) party elites have more extreme positions than do candidates; 3) candidate issue positioning is a function of party‐elite issue positions and union involvement in the campaign, as well as constituency characteristics; and 4) when candidates rely heavily on elite resources during their campaign, elites become more important in shaping candidate issue positions.

Tax Policy, Tax Competition, and Fiscal Rules: Insights from a Classroom Experiment and Surveys of Politicians

“…Some studies focus on the type or nature of politicians -for example, Stone et al (2004) for the U.S., and Muramatsu and Krauss (1984) for Japan. Several papers deal with the ideological stance of politicians, such as Frendreis et al (2003) considering state politicians in the U.S., and Putnam et al (1979) in a classic contribution based on a survey of Italian politicians. Finally, two studies elicited answers from politicians in the U.S. as to how they represent voters and organize their tasks (Kurtz et al, 2006;Harden, 2013).…”

Strategic party heterogeneity

“…In reality, party platforms and candidate positions rarely converge to the position of the median voter (Ansolabehere et al, 2001;Burden, 2004;Frendreis et al, 2003;Jessee 2010). Parties adopt more extreme positions to woo party activists (Aldrich, 1983;Aldrich and McGinnis, 1989;Frendreis et al, 2003) and primary voters (Burden, 2004;Owen and Grofman, 2006), or to deter abstention (Downs, 1957) or the entry of an independent or third-party candidate (Lee, 2012). Candidates may also have policy preferences of their own that are more extreme than those of the electorate (Aldrich, 2011;Calvert, 1985;Wittman, 1983).…”

How Gender Influences Roll Call Voting*

“…Thus, constituency demographics will serve as proxies for constituent preferences. Preferences are significantly correlated with social and economic characteristics (see, e.g., Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, ) and are generally accepted as a way to assess preferences in the absence of polling data (see, e.g., Patterson and Scully, ; Frendreis et al, ). Legislators were matched to legislative district demographic data from the 1990 census taken from the Almanac of State Legislatures .…”