Testing the Credit Market Timing Hypothesis Using Counterfactual Issuing Dates

Frank, Murray Z.; Nezafat, Pedram

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2316301

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“…Managers may try to time the market when it is subject to behavioural biases (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2008;Frank and Nezafat, 2013;Huang and Ritter, 2009). 1 Managers may issue debt when investors offer especially favourable terms 1 Cochrane (2011) argues that market timing may also arise in a rational framework as managers optimally respond to time-varying funding opportunities.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

REIT Financing Choices: Preparation Matters

2016

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Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014) find that risky capital structure characteristics, such as high leverage, a high share of debt due in the near future and a high share of variable-rate debt, significantly reduce the cumulative total returns of US REITs over the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In this paper we show that preparing ahead of the crisis significantly improved the cumulative return over the crisis period even after controlling for the levels of the relevant capital structure characteristics at the start of the crisis. Specifically, we document that REITs which reduced leverage and increased maturity prior to the crisis fared better during the crisis. For instance, a one standard deviation reduction in leverage generated a five percent higher cumulative return during the crisis. We further find that US REITs with the highest capital structure risk (high leverage and short maturities) were more likely to prepare for the crisis ahead by reducing leverage and extending maturity. This effect is especially large for REITs with strong governance. We also document that none of our findings hold for European REITs. This suggests that since European firms did not experience or observe the levels of market excess that occurred in the US before the crisis, whether or not they prepared for the crisis had no impact on their returns during the crisis. (2014) find that risky capital structure characteristics, such as high leverage, a high share of debt due in the near future and a high share of variable-rate debt, significantly reduce the cumulative total returns of US REITs over the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In this paper we show that preparing ahead of the crisis significantly improved the cumulative return over the crisis period even after controlling for the levels of the relevant capital structure characteristics at the start of the crisis. Specifically, we document that REITs which reduced leverage and increased maturity prior to the crisis fared better during the crisis. For instance, a one standard deviation reduction in leverage generated a five percent higher cumulative return during the crisis. We further find that US REITs with the highest capital structure risk (high leverage and short maturities) were more likely to prepare for the crisis ahead by reducing leverage and extending maturity. This effect is especially large for REITs with strong governance. We also document that none of our findings hold for European REITs. This suggests that since European firms did not experience or observe the levels of market excess that occurred in the US before the crisis, whether or not they prepared for the crisis had no impact on their returns during the crisis. WORK IN PROGRESS -DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%