2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.05.009
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Testing the effectiveness of consumer financial disclosure: Experimental evidence from savings accounts

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Cited by 23 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2020) provide further discussion of the impact of Regulation Q on deposit rates for banks and S&Ls.15 Consistent with low interest rate sensitivity,Adams et al (2021) conduct a large-scale field experiment in the United Kingdom and find that most households do not move savings accounts to other banks even if they are informed about significantly higher deposit rates elsewhere.…”
mentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2020) provide further discussion of the impact of Regulation Q on deposit rates for banks and S&Ls.15 Consistent with low interest rate sensitivity,Adams et al (2021) conduct a large-scale field experiment in the United Kingdom and find that most households do not move savings accounts to other banks even if they are informed about significantly higher deposit rates elsewhere.…”
mentioning
confidence: 93%
“…We also contribute to the literature on risk disclosures ( 46 49 ) and the broader literature on information disclosure ( 50 52 ). Although risk disclosures are common in many markets, many tend to be generic rather than specific (e.g., “driving is dangerous” versus “sharp turn ahead”).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Under costly search, lenders would earn a lender surplus of monopoly rents denoted LS in Figure 2 equal to log q(r j (c j ), p) ⇥ (log r j (c j ) log c j ) where the first term is the monopolist's markup and the second term is the monopolist's quantity. This non-zero lender surplus under costly search provides a positive rationale for sellers to endogenously differentiate, obfuscate, or otherwise increase switching or search costs (see also Ellison and Ellison, 2009;Allen, Clark, and Houde, 2019;Adams et al, 2019).…”
Section: Welfare Consequences Of Costly Searchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See also related evidence inAdams, Hunt, Palmer, and Zaliauskas (2019) andBhutta, Fuster, and Hizmo (2019) that many consumers underestimate the benefits and overestimate the costs of shopping for deposit products and mortgages, respectively.…”
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confidence: 99%