Testing two cognitive theories of insight.

Jones, Graeme A.

doi:10.1037/0278-7393.29.5.1017

Cited by 90 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(53 reference statements)

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“…The Representational Change Theory of insight and the matchstick arithmetic domain The Representational Change Theory (RCT; Ohlsson, 1992) has been successfully used to explain insight problem solving (Knoblich & Wartenberg, 1998;Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider & Rhenius, 1999;Knoblich, Ohlsson & Raney, 2001;Jones, 2003;Kershaw and Ohlsson 2004;Reverberi, Toraldo, D'Agostini, et al 2005). The theory supposes that the problem solver begins with an incorrect representation of a problem (due to prior knowledge), with the insight process involving the re-representation of the problem.…”

Section: Set and Insight In Problem Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

Öllinger

Jones

Knoblich

2008

Experimental Psychology

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114

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Mental set is the tendency to solve certain problems in a fixed way based on previous solutions to similar problems. The moment of insight occurs when a problem cannot be solved using solution methods suggested by prior experience and the problem solver suddenly realizes that the solution requires different solution methods. Mental set and insight have often been linked together and yet no attempt thus far has systematically examined the interplay between the two. Three experiments are presented that examine the extent to which sets of non-insight and insight problems affect the subsequent solutions of insight test problems. The results indicate a subtle interplay between mental set and insight: when the set involves non-insight problems, no mental set effects are shown for the insight test problems, yet when the set involves insight problems, both facilitation and inhibition can be seen depending on the type of insight problem presented in the set. A two process model is detailed to explain these findings that combines the representational change mechanism with that of proceduralisation.Set and Insight in Problem Solving 3

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Section: Set and Insight In Problem Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

Öllinger

Jones

Knoblich

2008

Experimental Psychology

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114

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“…Although Ohlsson's model (1992, p. 20) incorporates search as a necessary process before an impasse is met, the framework mainly focuses on what processes occur to release the problem solver from impasse, without a great deal of elaboration on the particular nature of search processes before Nine-dot problem 4 and after an impasse. Jones (2003) provided a model that elaborated Ohlsson's notion that insight problem solving can be understood as a sequential process of different phases (search -impasse -insight -search, see also Ash & Wiley, 2006). This model suggests that there might be a concerted interplay of search and impasse, with each affecting the other.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…insight), since this is not always the case (Jones, 2003). Equally, whether insight is achieved and if so how quickly it is achieved depends on multiple factors, such as the difficulty of a change to the problem representation and how large the problem space is ( In the present study we applied the above model to the nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930) that has kept problem solving researchers busy over the last decades (Burnham & Davis, 1969;Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004;Lung & Dominowski, 1985;MacGregor et al, 2001;Maier, 1930;Scheerer, 1963; Weisberg & Alba, Nine-dot problem 6 1981).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Doing so it acknowledges that for each problem there can be different combinations of causes of problem difficulty that have to be considered. For instance, Jones (2003) demonstrated for the car park problem that heuristics play an important role before an impasse, but breaking the impasse required a representational change. Recently, Öllinger and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that for different versions of the eight-coin problem (Ormerod et al, 2002) the main source of problem difficulty is determined by the required representational change.…”

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The dynamics of search, impasse, and representational change provide a coherent explanation of difficulty in the nine-dot problem

Öllinger

Jones

Knoblich³

2013

Psychological Research

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112

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The nine-dot problem is often used to demonstrate and explain mental impasse, creativity, and out of the box thinking. The present study investigated the interplay of a restricted initial search space, the likelihood of invoking a representational change, and the subsequent constraining of an unrestricted search space. In three experimental conditions, participants worked on different versions of the nine-dot problem that hinted at removing particular sources of difficulty from the standard problem. The hints were incremental such that the first suggested a possible route for a solution attempt; the second additionally indicated the dot at which lines meet on the solution path; and the final condition also provided non-dot locations that appear in the solution path. The results showed that in the experimental conditions, representational change is encountered more quickly and problems are solved more often than for the control group. We propose a cognitive model that focuses on general problem solving heuristics and representational change to explain problem difficulty.Keywords: Nine-Dot Problem, Insight, Heuristics, Search, Representational Change Nine-dot problem 3There is growing evidence that an insight to the solution of a problem can be characterized by a representational change (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999;Ohlsson, 1984aOhlsson, , 1992Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2008;Thevenot & Oakhill, 2008). This evidence makes it difficult to explain insight problem solving within the classical information-processing account (Newell & Simon, 1972), where problem solving is understood as search within a well-defined problem space (problem representation). The problem space account has no mechanism to implement a representational change for instances when the current search gets stuck, is insufficient, or does not reduce the distance to the desired goal.There are a few accounts that attempt to remedy this omission. One suggestion is to claim that insight problems are nothing special and therefore representational change plays only a marginal role. For such explanations, problem difficulty relates either to the size of the problem space being overly large and preventing exhaustive search (Kaplan & Simon, 1990), or that problem solvers apply inappropriate heuristics when searching the problem space Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002). Both accounts miss a cognitive process that addresses the change of the search space. In the first, an additional process is necessary that re-focuses on particular areas of the search space by changing the problem representation; in the second an additional cognitive process is required that changes the search space after repeated failures of the problem solving process.Ohlsson (Knoblich et al., 1999;Ohlsson, 1984aOhlsson, , 1984bOhlsson, , 1992) provided a detailed framework that stressed the importance of a representational change for insight problem solving, and identified impasse as a crucial pre-condition. Moreover, Ohlsson (1992) identified at least three ...

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The execution of planned detours by spider-eating predators

Cross

Jackson

2016

Jrnl Exper Analysis Behavior

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Many spiders from the salticid subfamily Spartaeinae specialize at preying on other spiders and they adopt complex strategies when targeting these dangerous prey. We tested 15 of these spider-eating spartaeine species for the capacity to plan detours ahead of time. Each trial began with the test subject on top of a tower from which it could view two boxes: one containing prey and the other not containing prey. The distance between the tower and the boxes was too far to reach by leaping and the tower sat on a platform surrounded by water. As the species studied are known to avoid water, the only way they could reach the prey without getting wet was by taking one of two circuitous walkways from the platform: one leading to the prey (‘correct’) and one not leading to the prey (‘incorrect’). After leaving the tower, the test subject could not see the prey and sometimes it had to walk past the incorrect walkway before reaching the correct walkway. Yet all 15 species chose the correct walkway significantly more often than the incorrect walkway. We propose that these findings exemplify genuine cognition based on representation.

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Testing two cognitive theories of insight.

Cited by 90 publications

References 22 publications

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

The dynamics of search, impasse, and representational change provide a coherent explanation of difficulty in the nine-dot problem

The execution of planned detours by spider-eating predators

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