Text and Context in the 1952 Presidential Campaign: Eisenhower's “I Shall Go to Korea” Speech

Abstract

This article examines the textual context of Eisenhower's famous “I Shall Go to Korea” speech, delivered during the closing days of the 1952 presidential campaign. Four interlocking contexts of discourse are identified–the discourses of cold war, foreign policy, Korea, and the Eisenhower persona. By rhetorically activating each of these contexts, Eisenhower invited his listeners to understand his speech not merely as a campaign pledge but as a rhetorically, historically, psychologically, and ideologically satisfying means of making sense of the Korean War. Dramatically structured in the form of a courtroom case, with Eisenhower taking on the roles of both prosecuting attorney and witness, the “I Shall Go to Korea” speech was rhetorically tailored to take advantage of the audience's preexisting beliefs, values, and attitudes.

Avoiding “A Chain Reaction of Disaster”: A Reappraisal of the Eisenhower White House’s Handling of the 1954–1955 Quemoy Crisis

“…One of the lead authors of the Republicans’ national party platform and soon‐to‐be secretary of state, John Foster Dulles (), put the matter bluntly in a Life magazine profile published in the midst of the campaign, wherein he declared that Truman’s foreign policy was a “negative” “treadmill” blocking the more robust task of “liberation” (146, 154). For the Republicans, Truman’s defensive policy of containment was akin to surrender; only the more aggressive policy of “liberation” would honor the full glory and obligation of America’s global mission (see Anderson ; Medhurst ).…”

“…As Medhurst () has argued, within this “prophetic dualism” the world was divided into realms of “light and darkness, with no shades of gray” (466; see also Bostdorff ).…”

“…The White House, then, was wary of both Mao and Chiang, feeling trapped between bad choices on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, the Eisenhower White House was torn between fulfilling the fiery “liberation” pledges launched during the presidential campaign of 1952 (see Medhurst ; ) and facing the stark realities of power politics in Asia. As David Halberstam () has observed, “a certain schizophrenia was at work here: We wanted to be the policeman of the world … but did not want to get involved in a messy, costly foreign war” (67).…”

Ending the Korean War

“…In fact, aH arris polli ndicated that in late October 1952, 52 per cento ft he American public saw Koreaa so ne of the mosti mportant problems facing the country. 4 The Truman administration had become synonymous with the bloodyconflict foughtinadistant and unknown land overwhelminglyb y US troops since June 1950.M oreover, the fighting had continued despitet he fact thatas talemateh ad been reached, alongt he 38 th parallel, in the spring of 1951 and truce negotiations had begun in July thaty ear.T ruman'ss trategy of fighting alimited warinKorea offered no hope of ad ecisivev ictorya nd appeared to be failing to wear down the will of the enemy. The early popularityofthe Korean Wari nt he United States, where it was perceived as an act of resistance against Soviet-directedc ommunisti mperialism, had given waytodisillusionment.…”

No Shades of Gray: The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press

“…We posited that in the weeks and months after September 11 President Bush employed two Cold War-tested binaries: good/evil and security/peril. As Medhurst (2000) noted, "The discourse of cold war pictured a Manichean world of light and darkness, with no shades of gray. Communism was a demonic force unalterably opposed to all that was good" (p. 465).…”