$$\textsc {Wys}^\star $$ : A DSL for Verified Secure Multi-party Computations

Rastogi, Aseem; Swamy, Nikhil; Hicks, Michael

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-17138-4_5

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 53 publications

(77 reference statements)

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“…It uses SBMC in a compiler framework translating secure computations of ANSI C programs into an optimized Boolean circuit which can subsequently be implemented securely utilizing the garbled circuit approach. Another similar setting to ours is analyzed by Rastogi et al [27], who also assume an "honest-but-curious" attacker model. Therein, a domain-specific language is built on top of the F language, a full-featured, verification-oriented, effectful programming language by Swamy et al [29].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 82%

Card-Based Cryptography Meets Formal Verification

2021

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Card-based cryptography provides simple and practicable protocols for performing secure multi-party computation with just a deck of cards. For the sake of simplicity, this is often done using cards with only two symbols, e.g., $$\clubsuit $$ ♣ and $$\heartsuit $$ ♡ . Within this paper, we also target the setting where all cards carry distinct symbols, catering for use-cases with commonly available standard decks and a weaker indistinguishability assumption. As of yet, the literature provides for only three protocols and no proofs for non-trivial lower bounds on the number of cards. As such complex proofs (handling very large combinatorial state spaces) tend to be involved and error-prone, we propose using formal verification for finding protocols and proving lower bounds. In this paper, we employ the technique of software bounded model checking (SBMC), which reduces the problem to a bounded state space, which is automatically searched exhaustively using a SAT solver as a backend. Our contribution is threefold: (a) we identify two protocols for converting between different bit encodings with overlapping bases, and then show them to be card-minimal. This completes the picture of tight lower bounds on the number of cards with respect to runtime behavior and shuffle properties of conversion protocols. For computing AND, we show that there is no protocol with finite runtime using four cards with distinguishable symbols and fixed output encoding, and give a four-card protocol with an expected finite runtime using only random cuts. (b) We provide a general translation of proofs for lower bounds to a bounded model checking framework for automatically finding card- and run-minimal (i.e., the protocol has a run of minimal length) protocols and to give additional confidence in lower bounds. We apply this to validate our method and, as an example, confirm our new AND protocol to have its shortest run for protocols using this number of cards. (c) We extend our method to also handle the case of decks on symbols $$\clubsuit $$ ♣ and $$\heartsuit $$ ♡ , where we show run-minimality for two AND protocols from the literature.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 82%

Card-Based Cryptography Meets Formal Verification

2021

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“…Moreover, if the programmers decide to use a different public view, they have to fix every place where this data type is used. ObliVM [Liu et al 2015] is a Java-like language which also has a struct keyword to define data types, but only supports public structures, much like Obliv-C. Wysteria and Wys * [Rastogi et al 2014[Rastogi et al , 2019 are functional languages that focus on mixed-mode computation. While they do not support recursive data types, both languages include simple polynomial types and primitive arrays.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Obliv-C [Zahur and Evans 2015] is a C-like language for MPC applications which compiles down to Yao's Garbled Circuits. Other notable languages include ObliVM [Liu et al 2015], Wysteria/Wys* [Rastogi et al 2014[Rastogi et al , 2019, 𝜆 obliv [Darais et al 2020].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oblivious algebraic data types

Delaware

2022

Proc. ACM Program. Lang.

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Secure computation allows multiple parties to compute joint functions over private data without leaking any sensitive data, typically using powerful cryptographic techniques. Writing secure applications using these techniques directly can be challenging, resulting in the development of several programming languages and compilers that aim to make secure computation accessible. Unfortunately, many of these languages either lack or have limited support for rich recursive data structures, like trees. In this paper, we propose a novel representation of structured data types, which we call oblivious algebraic data types, and a language for writing secure computations using them. This language combines dependent types with constructs for oblivious computation, and provides a security-type system which ensures that adversaries can learn nothing more than the result of a computation. Using this language, authors can write a single function over private data, and then easily build an equivalent secure computation according to a desired public view of their data.

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“…These have been proposed for verifiable computation [82]- [85], zero-knowledge [86]- [89], and secure multiparty computation [90] protocols, which are parameterized by a proof-goal or a functionality to compute. Some are supported by proofs that guarantee the output protocols are correct and/or secure for every input specification [91]- [94]. We recommend readers to also consult other related surveys.…”

Section: F Further Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography

Barbosa

Barthe

Bhargavan

et al. 2021

2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

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Computer-aided cryptography is an active area of research that develops and applies formal, machine-checkable approaches to the design, analysis, and implementation of cryptography. We present a cross-cutting systematization of the computer-aided cryptography literature, focusing on three main areas: (i) design-level security (both symbolic security and computational security), (ii) functional correctness and efficiency, and (iii) implementation-level security (with a focus on digital side-channel resistance). In each area, we first clarify the role of computer-aided cryptography-how it can help and what the caveats are-in addressing current challenges. We next present a taxonomy of state-of-the-art tools, comparing their accuracy, scope, trustworthiness, and usability. Then, we highlight their main achievements, trade-offs, and research challenges. After covering the three main areas, we present two case studies. First, we study efforts in combining tools focused on different areas to consolidate the guarantees they can provide. Second, we distill the lessons learned from the computer-aided cryptography community's involvement in the TLS 1.3 standardization effort. Finally, we conclude with recommendations to paper authors, tool developers, and standardization bodies moving forward.

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$$\textsc {Wys}^\star $$ : A DSL for Verified Secure Multi-party Computations

Cited by 13 publications

References 53 publications

Card-Based Cryptography Meets Formal Verification

Card-Based Cryptography Meets Formal Verification

Oblivious algebraic data types

SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography

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