The 2014 Tokwe‐Mukorsi floods: Were the civil protection authorities in Zimbabwe prepared for the disaster?

Abstract

Flood preparedness involves building capacities that enable minimising losses through effective response and recovery. While there are many preparedness assessments at household and community level, very few have been conducted at institutional level. This study assessed the households' perspectives of the preparedness of civil protection institutions in Zimbabwe during the 2014 Tokwe‐Mukorsi flood disaster and identified the capacity building needs of the civil protection institutions. It used a 5‐point Likert scale to measure six preparedness indicators: emergency plans, early warning systems, evacuation, resources, disaster knowledge, and relocation camp management. Data came from a cross‐sectional survey involving 656 household‐heads who were randomly selected among the affected villagers of Tokwe‐Mukorsi. The findings revealed various gaps in preparedness both at indicator and at variable level. While some indicators showed incipient levels of development in all their variables, others had a combination of low and developed variables. The preparedness elements that critically need immediate attention include the development of emergency plans, evacuation of populations at risk and the prepositioning of resources. However, it is pertinent to mention that civil protection systems in Zimbabwe need to strengthen most of their preparedness elements. As such, this study recommends strengthening preparedness activities in civil protection systems.

Disaster policy framework analysis: Experts' perspectives on the usefulness of the disaster legislation in Zimbabwe

“…Local government and sub-national civil protection authorities are poorly resourced to the extent that they are unable to respond to any disaster. The problem of centralisation of resources and response operation was witnessed during the Tokwe-Mukorsi flood disaster when the dam basin started filling resulting in the inundation of communities living upstream (Mavhura, 2021). No organisation or institution took action to evacuate and relocate the communities affected because they were not mandated to do so.…”

“…This was witnessed during many disaster events including the Tokwe‐Mukorsi flood disaster of 2014, the El Nino‐induced drought of 2015/2016, the Cyclone Dineo of 2017 and the Cyclone Idai disaster of 2019. Prior to the Tokwe‐Mukorsi flood disaster, the government of Zimbabwe failed to relocate about 6000 households from the dam basin partly due to lack of funds (Mavhura, 2021). Likewise, the government did not have funds to evacuate people from the low‐lying areas in Tsholotsho district when the meteorological agency forecast that the communities in that district were at high risk of flooding from Cyclone Dineo (Dube et al, 2018; Moses & Ramotonto, 2018).…”

The Spiral of Escalating Water Conflict: The Theory of Hydro-Politics

“…Another example is the SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses signed in 2000 by Mozambique and Zimbabwe for the Sabi River Basin [75]. In 2014, heavy flooding caused a partial failure in the Tokwe Mukorsi dam that put at risk the lives of ~40,000 people [76,77]. This followed by the Pungwe Basin Bilateral Agreement in 2016 to adopt a prevention flood strategy and support institutional transboundary water management [78].…”