The accelerating pace of biotech democratization

Jackson, Shawn S.; Sumner, Louise; Garnier, Christian; Basham, Casey; Sun, Landy; Simone, Peter L.; Gardner, Danielle S.; Casagrande, Rocco

doi:10.1038/s41587-019-0339-0

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…It has been postulated already that genome editing will be a democratizing technique; however, these assertions were based on qualitative reasoning or very early milestones of technology development (Jackson et al, 2019). In this work we present evidence for this trend that is collected closer to the actual use of this technology.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 66%

Gene Editing Regulation and Innovation Economics

Whelan

Gutti

Lema

2020

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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Argentina was the first country that enacted regulatory criteria to assess if organisms resulting from new breeding techniques (NBTs) are to be regarded as genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or not. The country has now accumulated 4 year of experience applying such criteria, reaching a considerable number of cases, composed mostly of gene-edited plants, animals, and microorganisms of agricultural use. This article explores the effects on economic innovation of such regulatory experience. This is done by comparing the cases of products derived from gene editing and other NBTs that have been presented to the regulatory system, against the cases of GMOs that have been deregulated in the country. Albeit preliminary, this analysis suggests that products from gene editing will have different profiles and market release rates compared with the first wave of products from the so called "modern biotechnology." Gene editing products seems to follow a much faster development rate from bench to market. Such development is driven by a more diverse group of developers, and led mostly by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and public research institutions. In addition, product profiles are also more diversified in terms of traits and organisms. The inferences of these findings for the agricultural and biotechnology sectors, particularly in developing countries, are discussed.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 66%

Gene Editing Regulation and Innovation Economics

Whelan

Gutti

Lema

2020

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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“…Misuse risks can be classified into biosafety risks, concerning accidental exposure and release, and biosecurity risks, concerning deliberate misuse [ 3 ]. As biotechnology grows more powerful and accessible [ 4 ], risks from accidental or deliberate misuse of research may increase.…”

Section: Risks From Biological Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biosecurity in an age of open science

Smith

Sandbrink

2022

PLoS Biol

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The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

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“…To the Editor -In their Correspondence "The accelerating pace of biotech democratization, " Jackson et al 1 find evidence for an accelerated pace at which novel biotechnologies become widely available. They state that biotechnologies that are initially available to only a handful of well-resourced specialists currently take about 4.5 years to spread to people with relatively low levels of technical skills and financial resources.…”

Section: Democratizing Biotechnology Requires More Than Availabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratizing biotechnology requires more than availability

Beumer

2021

Nat Biotechnol

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Innovation Information Initiative. " We are grateful to Amazon Web Services for a grant from their COVID Emergency Response team for support of cloud-based computing and platform expenses. We thank Adrian Gibbs, Gilbert Faure and Marie-Christine Béné for their edits, review and constructive comments on the earlier version of the SARS-CoV-2 report prototype. The extended online version can be accessed at https://link.lens.org/ tk10f5UfAbb.

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The accelerating pace of biotech democratization

Cited by 11 publications

References 7 publications

Gene Editing Regulation and Innovation Economics

Gene Editing Regulation and Innovation Economics

Biosecurity in an age of open science

Democratizing biotechnology requires more than availability

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