The acceptability and uptake of smartphone tracking for COVID-19 in Australia

Abstract

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many Governments are instituting mobile tracking technologies to perform rapid contact tracing. However, these technologies are only effective if the public is willing to use them, implying that their perceived public health benefits must outweigh personal concerns over privacy and security. The Australian federal government recently launched the ‘COVIDSafe’ app, designed to anonymously register nearby contacts. If a contact later identifies as infected with COVID-19, health department officials can rapidly followup with their registered contacts to stop the virus’ spread. The current study assessed attitudes towards three tracking technologies (telecommunication network tracking, a government app, and Apple and Google’s Bluetooth exposure notification system) in two representative samples of the Australian public prior to the launch of COVIDSafe. We compared these attitudes to usage of the COVIDSafe app after its launch in a further two representative samples of the Australian public. Using Bayesian methods, we find widespread acceptance for all tracking technologies, however, observe a large intention-behaviour gap between people’s stated attitudes and actual uptake of the COVIDSafe app. We consider the policy implications of these results for Australia and the world at large.

Best Practice Guidance for Digital Contact Tracing Apps: A Cross-disciplinary Review of the Literature

“…DCTAs need to maintain a contact log, generate a contact alert, and link users with the test and trace system. The IDCTA needs to perform these functions while respecting individual privacy rights and adhering to data protection regulation [ 14 , 22 , 37 , 40 - 42 , 52 , 56 , 69 , 72 , 74 - 76 , 84 , 122 - 124 ]. The European Charter of Human Rights Article 8 states that individuals have a right to respect for private life, but interference with this right can occur if it is deemed necessary, proportionate, and in accordance with the law [ 186 ].…”

“…Google and Apple control which DCTAs use the API and for how long the API is operational in a given region [ 141 ]. There should be an agreed timeline and criteria for when the API and DCTA infrastructure is to be dismantled [ 76 , 121 , 124 , 141 ] because there are significant privacy concerns that technology companies and governments could use DCTAs to enable greater surveillance after the pandemic [ 26 , 37 , 65 , 66 , 76 ]. Using an API comes with the risk that personal data may be misused or processed unlawfully.…”

“…For the IDCTA, the choice of which technology to use to detect contact events will be influenced by its cost, energy use, accuracy, availability, accessibility, adherence to data protection regulation, and by how it effects privacy preservation and overall DCTA effectiveness [ 14 , 17 , 37 , 40 , 42 , 52 , 61 , 69 , 76 , 141 ]. These in turn influence DCTA population penetration.…”

“…• Loss of trust in public health authorities and public health measures [14, 56,66] The IDCTA should be voluntary and consent-based according to the WHO and ECDC ethical guidance on DCTAs, and this view is also prevalent in the academic literature [40,[51][52][53][54][55]. For voluntary DCTAs, ensuring transparency and trustworthiness is important to maximize population penetration [52,53,[71][72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79].…”

Best Practice Guidance for Digital Contact Tracing Apps: A Cross-disciplinary Review of the Literature (Preprint)

“…There should be an agreed timeline and criteria for when the API and DCTA infrastructure is to be dismantled [76,121,124,141] because there are significant privacy concerns that technology companies and governments could use DCTAs to enable greater surveillance after the pandemic [26,37,65,66,76]. Using an API comes with the risk that personal data may be misused or processed unlawfully.…”