“…The information value of DAC dissimilar to OCF and NDAC critically depends on the managerial discretionary accounting alternatives decisions and the related market’s investors’ interpretation. More precisely, managers use DAC to manage earnings opportunistically (Healy, 1985; Healy and Palepu, 1993 and Subramanyam, 1996) or to signal to the market the firm’s future prospects (Linck et al , 2013; and Doukakis and Papanastasopoulos, 2014). To the level that DAC is the output of financial reporting managerial opportunism, investors would rationally assign a negative DAC value; therefore, it is more likely to observe an insignificant or weak association between stock returns and DAC (Teoh et al , 1998a, b; DuCharme et al , 2004; Louis, 2004; and Choi et al , 2011).…”