The Activation of Populist Attitudes

Hawkins, Kirk A.; Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira; Andreadis, Ioannis

doi:10.1017/gov.2018.23

Cited by 144 publications

(134 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…It requires looking beyond the discourse of presidents to that of other elite-level actors such as opposition politicians and civil society activists. And it requires moving beyond elite-level data to the thinking of ordinary citizens, viewable through survey data, ethnographic research, and experiments (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014;Fernandes 2010;Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese 2016;Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012). Putting it another way, it requires looking at both the supply of and the demand for populism, as well as how these interact.…”

Section: Conclusion: the Lessons Of Alternative Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ideational Approach to Populism

Hawkins

Kaltwasser

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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235

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Although the study of populism has traditionally been the domain of Latin Americanists, research here has become increasingly comparative. One of the most important payoffs of this comparative work is conceptual. Rather than defining populism in structuralist, economic, or political-strategic terms, a growing number of scholars around the world are using an ideational conceptualization that draws heavily from earlier discursive theories. By employing the ideational approach, scholars have been able to provide empirical measures of populist discourse. In this article we explain and show the advantages of this ideational approach to a Latin American audience by presenting a new historical dataset measuring the discourse of Argentine, Chilean, and Peruvian presidents across the twentieth century. Our main intent is to clarify the ideational approach as well as to enliven the conceptual debate. While we are critical of alternative definitions, we acknowledge and reassess their theoretical insights.Aun cuando el estudio del populismo ha sido tradicionalmente un campo de los latinoamericanistas, la investigación al respecto se ha vuelto cada vez más comparativa. Uno de los beneficios más importantes de los trabajos comparados es conceptual. En vez de definir al populismo en términos estructurales, económicos o político-estratégicos, un creciente número de académicos alrededor del mundo utilizan una conceptualización ideacional vinculada con previas teorías discursivas. Mediante el uso del enfoque ideacional académicos han sido capaces de proveer mediciones empíricas de discurso populista. En este artículo explicamos y mostramos las ventajas del enfoque ideacional mediante la discusión de una nueva base de datos que mide el discurso de los presidentes de Argentina, Chile y Perú durante el siglo veinte. Nuestra principal intensión es clarificar el enfoque ideacional y a su vez avivar el debate conceptual. Si bien es cierto que somos críticos de definiciones alternativas, reconocemos y reconsideramos sus aportes teóricos.

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Section: Conclusion: the Lessons Of Alternative Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ideational Approach to Populism

Hawkins

Kaltwasser

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

Self Cite

235

110

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“…2 Hawkins proposes a highly similar definition: populism is, according to him, 'a Manichean discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite ' (2009: 1042). These definitions have in common that: (1) they focus on the antagonistic relationship between the good people and the evil elite; and (2) they conceive of populism as a set of ideas (Hawkins et al, 2012).…”

Section: Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They also share with each other that they perceive populism as more than merely a particular rhetoric, style, or strategy. Populism is conceived of as being a substantive message -or a set of ideas (Hawkins et al, 2012). As a set of ideas, populism can be attached to different ideologies, ranging from left-wing to right-wing and from progressive to conservative.…”

Section: Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties

Rooduijn

2017

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

324

252

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Various scholars have argued and demonstrated that Western European populist parties have something in common. Although these parties adhere to various ideologies and employ different organizational forms and political styles, they all endorse a similar set of ideas concerning the relationship between the people and the elite. Yet despite our increasing knowledge about these parties, so far we know only very little about populist voters. Do the voter bases of populist parties also have something in common? To answer that question, I focus on the electorates of 15 prototypical populist parties from 11 Western European countries. I show that, in contrast with widely held beliefs, the electorates of populist parties do not always consist of individuals who are more likely to be 'losers of globalization' with Eurosceptic attitudes, low levels of political trust, and preferences for (more) direct democracy. This suggests that 'the' populist voter does not exist.

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“…those who have more pluralist attitudes (favouring compromise and listening to other opinions) -and from voters who have more elitist attitudes -i.e. arguing that politicians should lead and not follow the people, or that successful individuals from business or independent experts should govern Hawkins et al 2012). …”

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confidence: 99%

Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

Spierings

Zaslove

2017

West European Politics

137

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Empirical studies have demonstrated that compared to almost all other parties, populist radical right (PRR) parties draw more votes from men than from women. However, the two dominant explanations that are generally advanced to explain this disparity -gender differences regarding socio-economic position and lower perceptions regarding the threat of immigrants -cannot fully explain the difference. The article contends that it might actually be gender differences regarding the conceptualisation of society and politics -populist attitudesthat explain the gender gap. Thus, the gap may be due, in part, to differences in socialisation. The article analyses EES 2014 data on voting for the populist radical right and the populist radical left in nine European countries. Across countries, the gender gap in voting for the PRR is indeed partly explained by populist attitudes. For populist radical left parties, the results are less clear, suggesting that populism has different meanings to voters on the left and on the right. KEYWORDS populism; gender gap; voting behaviour; populist radical right; left-wing populism; europeThe electoral success of populist parties does not seem to subside. In fact, it appears that the opposite is true: in addition to the continuing success of populist radical right parties (PRR), in recent years, there has also been a surge in populist (radical) left parties. Recent examples include Podemos in Spain, SYRIZA in Greece, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, 1 the Dutch Socialistische Partij, and Die Linke in Germany. The continued, and perhaps even growing, success of populist parties presents us with an interesting question: why do voters continue to support populist parties?CONTACT niels spierings n.spierings@maw.ru.nl OPEN ACCESS 822 N. SPIERINGS AND A. ZASLOVEResearch in the last 10 to 15 years has provided answers to this question. Reasons for the support for the populist radical right are found in opposition to immigration (e.g. Immerzeel 2015;Lubbers et al. 2002;Norris 2005;Spierings and Zaslove 2015b), lower levels of trust in political institutions (Norris 2005) and being less well educated, younger, and male (Harteveld et al. 2015;Immerzeel 2015;Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). In contrast, supporters of the populist radical left are marginally more supportive of economic equality than supporters of other parties (Visser et al. 2014). The socio-economic profile of (populist) radical left parties is, however, less clear. Visser et al. (2014) show that those with lower incomes and those who are unemployed are more likely to possess a radical left ideology. Ramiro (2016) finds that those who identify with the working class are more likely to support radical left parties. Education is, however, more complicated: both less well and more highly educated voters are attracted to the radical left (Ramiro 2016). Nevertheless, there is a quality that the populist radical right and populist left parties have in common: their populist attitudes .Despite our growing knowledge of why voters support the ...

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The Activation of Populist Attitudes

Cited by 144 publications

References 56 publications

The Ideational Approach to Populism

The Ideational Approach to Populism

What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties

Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

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