The Advance of Marketization in North Korea: Between political rigidity and economic flexibility

Kong, Tat Yan

doi:10.1017/s0026749x18000550

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…North Korea's new class of wealthy private elites, known as “money masters” ( tonju , 돈주), has a corrupt yet symbiotic relationship with the state. Through connections and relationships, tonju gain permission to use state assets to generate profits, with their state partners of course taking a sizeable cut (Kong 2020). State–business collusion may take many forms, such as tonju “renting” access to state factories for production, buying official titles that allow them to bypass regulations, investing in and realizing profits from state-owned building projects, or mobilizing private resources to help state-owned enterprises meet their production goals.…”

Section: The Regime Embraces Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea

Carothers

2022

J. East Asian Stud.

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North Korea is widely seen as having among the most corrupt governments in the world. However, the Kim family regime has not always been so accepting of government wrongdoing. Drawing on archival evidence, this study shows that Kim Il-sung saw corruption as a threat to economic development and launched campaigns to curb it throughout the 1950s. I find that these campaigns were at least somewhat successful, and they contributed to post-Korean War reconstruction and rapid development afterwards. So when and why did the regime shift from combating corruption to embracing it? I argue that changes in the country's economic system following the crisis of the 1990s, especially de facto marketization, made corruption more beneficial to the regime both as a source of revenue and as an escape valve for public discontent. This study's findings contribute to our understanding of the politics of corruption control in authoritarian regimes.

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Section: The Regime Embraces Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea

Carothers

2022

J. East Asian Stud.

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“…Sanctions have yet to achieve their stated goal of denuclearisation. 4 Studies have argued that while sanctions have limited the DPRK's economic growth potential, they have not prohibited it (Kong, 2018) and that state trading companies have increased their procurement capacities under sanctions (Park and Walsh, 2016). This is demonstrative of the 'double-edged' sword of sanctions that appears in academic discourse.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Sanctions against North Korea on Humanitarian Aid

Zadeh-Cummings

Harris

2020

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs

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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has been a recipient of international humanitarian aid from international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) since 1995. In recent years, multilateral and unilateral sanctions in response to the DPRK’s nuclear programme have created a new layer of difficulty for humanitarians looking to engage with the authoritarian state. This paper explores how sanctions are affecting humanitarian work in practice, utilising interviews with practitioners. The research first surveys documentation, particularly from IOs, to establish how humanitarians understand contemporary need inside the country. Next, this paper examines the impacts of sanctions on aid efforts, with a particular focus on multilateral United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and unilateral American measures. Unpacking humanitarian challenges and potential ways to navigate the sanctions regime provides a foundation for academics and humanitarian practitioners to better understand both the DPRK and possible avenues for principled, effective aid.

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“…So, it can be concluded that the credibility of central is a source of rigidity, i.e. price contract (Kong, 2020) I www.irmbrjournal.com…”

Section: Price-setting (Price Contracts)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Price Rigidity and Flexibility: Some Survey Evidence for the Pakistan.

Iqbal¹,

Amin²,

Alam³

2020

IRMBR

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The objective of the study is to estimate the determinants of price stickiness or flexibility. Data is collected through structured questionnaire from 342 firms, which are selected through stratified random sampling technique from the Industrial Estate of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. To estimate the determinants of price flexibility/rigidity, models are estimated through ordinary least squares technique and binary logistic technique. The most important factors for price stickiness are implicit/explicit price contracts and minimum price volatility. Imperfect competitive market structure, number of regular customers, backward-looking behavior, and credibility of central bank and size of the firm are important determinants of price rigidity. While economic literacy and information set regarding expected inflation make the prices flexible. Study recommend that monetary policy of Pakistan should use other transmission channels of money supply instead of traditional channel, because it is found that the degree of price rigidity is low in Pakistan. Keywords: Price Rigidity, Price Flexibility, Price Contract, Frequency of Price Change.

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The Advance of Marketization in North Korea: Between political rigidity and economic flexibility

Cited by 7 publications

References 27 publications

The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea

The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea

The Impact of Sanctions against North Korea on Humanitarian Aid

Determinants of Price Rigidity and Flexibility: Some Survey Evidence for the Pakistan.

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