The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya

Miakinkov, Eugene

doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.608946

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…43 In order to explain the causes of what many have considered a fairly successful COIN, the literature has focused on the processes of Chechenization, that is, the deployment by the Russian counterinsurgents of indigenous Chechen forces against the Chechen insurgents and the societal implications thereof. Specifically, the literature has focused on the strategies and tactics of the local COIN, 62 the role of co-ethnic militias or paramilitary forces in relationship to intelligence gathering, 63 the "hearts and minds" approach of the incumbent and the cooptation of the Kadyrov clan, 64 as well as on the long-term effect of the Chechenization policy on Chechen society. 65 Emphasis has been put on the mechanisms of collective responsibility and civilian victimization deployed by Chechnya's pro-Moscow authorities, and the efficacy of deploying the kadyrovtsy paramilitaries as a committed and experienced force with access to intelligence on the ground and partial local support.…”

Section: A History Of Armed Conflict In Chechnyamentioning

confidence: 99%

Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

Souleimanov

Aliyev

Ratelle

2016

Terrorism and Political Violence

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Can former insurgents in the service of counterinsurgent paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections of individuals who have already "betrayed" once? Drawing on a unique set of primary data, this article examines the effective counter-defection practices of Chechnya's pro-Moscow paramilitaries toward prospective defectors from among ex-insurgents. It explores three interwoven mechanisms employed with various intensity to avert "double defections" at the peak of the locally fought counterinsurgency in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005. These mechanisms are: (1) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and their relatives, (2) initiatory violence targeting insurgents' relatives and (3) disclosure of the identities of defected insurgents who were responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain insurgents. Can former insurgents in the service of counter-insurgency paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections 1 of individuals who have already "betrayed" once? Despite the fact that "double defections" 2 are a fairly widespread occurrence among paramilitary organizations, few studies have explicitly analysed the phenomenon of defection among insurgents-turned-counterinsurgents. We likewise have a poor understanding of the particular counter-defection measures aimed against side-switchers, 3 i.e. insurgents who switch sides to join their former enemies. While some studies have covered counter-defection mechanisms employed by insurgent groups, 4 no study to date has either empirically or theoretically examined the counter-defection measures used by paramilitaries on side-switchers. Drawing on the case study of Chechnya, this empirical article starts to fill the gap in the extant scholarship on counter-defection mechanisms aimed at both former defectors and double defectors among counter-insurgent paramilitaries. Relying predominantly on previously unpublished first-hand evidence from the early years of the Second Chechen War, it identifies three unique and interwoven mechanisms employed by pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitary units-known as kadyrovtsy-to cement the loyalty of former defectors in order to prevent them from returning to, or supporting, insurgency. The first mechanism is extrajudicial executions of "double-defectors" and their relatives, which were widely practiced by kadyrovtsy as a form of intimidation for other

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Section: A History Of Armed Conflict In Chechnyamentioning

confidence: 99%

Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

Souleimanov

Aliyev

Ratelle

2016

Terrorism and Political Violence

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“…According to Russell, 'Chechenisation is understood (…) to mean the delegation of power (including countering separatist insurgents) from the federal centre in Moscow to approved officials in Chechnya who support Kremlin policies ' (2008, 678). Other authors have described Chechenization as the key feature of the 'hearts and minds' approach of the Russian counter-insurgency in Chechnya (Miakinkov 2011;Schaefer 2011;Kim and Caucasus Survey Blank 2013). Others have preferred to define it in terms of the 'empowerment of pro-Moscow Chechens headed up by representatives of the Kadyrov family' (Dunlop 2012); 'draw[ing] Chechens who are loyal to Russia into administration of the region and fighting the separatists' (Melvin 2007); and 'splitting the Chechens along religious and clan ties' (Schaefer 2011; see also Kim and Blank 2013).…”

Section: Chechenization: a New Counter-insurgency Model?mentioning

confidence: 99%

A critical assessment of the scholarship on violent conflicts in the North Caucasus during the post-Soviet period

Ratelle

2015

CASU

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This article provides an in-depth literature review of the different trends and debates in the English academic literature on the violent conflicts in the North Caucasus during the postSoviet period. This literature review is separated into three major debates and focused on four major themes that consistently appear in the study of violent conflicts in the North Caucasus: nationalism and identity (grievance), criminality and opportunism (greed), repression (revenge and trauma), and religion (radicalization). The first debate concentrates on the structural factors explaining mass mobilization in the North Caucasus following the end of the Soviet Union. The second debate underscores the role of religious radicalization in mobilization patterns in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, as well as its potential links with other conflicts (Afghanistan and Syria) and the importance of suicide bombings. Finally, the third debate focuses on the study of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism, the development of the Caucasus Emirate, and the diffusion of insurgent violence across the region. The article concludes by underlining the need to engage on a larger theorization of violent mobilization in the North Caucasus seeking to integrate structural, organizational and individual variables linking the global dynamics and local specificities of the region.

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“…Interviews with rebel leaders were replaced with largely positive stories about 'success against a 'terrorist' enemy'. (Miakinkov 2011, 665, quoting Oliker 2001 These efforts were largely conducive to public support for the operation. 432 Here, the effects of Apparently, the degree of political parallelism was already high enough for him to assume that the private media would not jeopardise goal attainment of the larger communication strategy (Simons and Strovsky 2006, 203-207).…”

Section: Pain 2005amentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocrats versus terrorists : what Conditions authoritarian counter-terrorism?

Korte¹

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This dissertation explores the breadth and variation of authoritarian counter-terrorism strategies and their legitimacy-related origins to challenge prevailing assumptions in Terrorism Studies. Research and analysis are conducted in the form of a Structured Focused Comparison of domestic counter-terrorism strategies in two electoral autocracies. The first case is Russia’s domestic engagement against a mix of ethno-separatist and Islamist terrorism emanating from its North Caucasus republics between 1999 and 2018. The second case is China’s engagement vis-à-vis a similar type of terrorism in its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region between 1990 and 2018. The comparison shows that, contrary to prevailing assumptions, the two strategies differ immensely from one another while containing significant if not predominant non-coercive elements. It further shows that the two strategies are closely related to the two states’ sources and resources of legitimacy, both in their original motivation to tackle the terrorist threat and in the design of counter-terrorism strategies. Drawing on David Beetham’s theory of The Legitimation of Power and on the Comparative Politics, Terrorism Studies and Civil War literatures, the dissertation explores the influence of five sources and (re)sources of legitimacy on the two counter-terrorism strategies: responsiveness, performance legitimacy, ideology, discursive power and co-optation. While governmental discursive power is discarded as a source of variation, findings are significant with respect to the influence of ideology and performance legitimacy. Reliance on ideology or related patterns for legitimation raise vulnerability to terrorism and constrain or facilitate the adoption of communicative and preventive measures that accommodate the grievances of potentially defective or even violently terrorist groups. Performance legitimacy is a key motivator in counter-terrorism and an influence on certain types of counter-terrorism policies. Responsiveness and co-optation are identified as potential sources of variation, based on idiosyncratic concurrence with policy choices.

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The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya

Cited by 12 publications

References 23 publications

Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

A critical assessment of the scholarship on violent conflicts in the North Caucasus during the post-Soviet period

Autocrats versus terrorists : what Conditions authoritarian counter-terrorism?

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