The Agent–Structure Debate and America's Vietnam Options: A Reply to Professor Gavan Duffy

Abstract

This article responds to Gavan Duffy's critique of Analogies at War in his recent essay on the agent-structure debate in the JJPS (2001, 2: 161–175). I argue that Duffy's use of Analogies at War to pursue his thesis about “giving structure its due” is flawed because he (1) fails to assess the book in terms of the outcomes it seeks to explain; (2) conflates “structure” with process, perceptual, and personality variables; (3) misinterprets my assumptions while neglecting the findings of recent works that corroborate the findings of Analogies at War; and (4) fails to demonstrate one of his key suggestions, i.e. the importance of showing how agents and structures are mutually constitutive. The article concludes by discussing some pointers raised by the exchange for furthering the agent-structure debate.

The Agent-Structure Co-Constitution and the Vietnam Commitment Decisions: A Rejoinder to Yuen Foong Khong

“…I certainly did not, as Khong (2002: 16) claims, neglect McNamara's (1995 comment 30 years later concerning the importance of Munich for his generation. His statement that 'analogies are false in logic' conveys that diagnoses of the situation in Vietnam should not rely on analogies, and his 'although significant in psychology' implies that analogies are useful tools for persuasion and thus also for policy justification and advocacy.…”

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This essay responds to Yuen Foong Khong's (2002) spirited defence of his Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Khong, 1992). The author had earlier criticized Khong's overemphasis of agency over structure in his accounting of the 1965 US troop deployment decisions (Duffy, 2001).

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“…I find both gratifying and disappointing Yuen Foong Khong's (2002) lengthy response to my criticism (Duffy, 2001) of his Analogies at War (Khong, 1992), in which he explores the 1965 US decision to commit ground troops in Vietnam. Khong's decision to respond gratifies me initially.…”

Der Irakkrieg 2003

“…Ähnlich argumentiert Smith (2001, 38), der zwar den Einfluss von Strukturen auf Akteure anerkennt, letzteren aber die Fähigkeit zuspricht, Konstella-tionen zu interpretieren, Entscheidungen zu treffen und umzusetzen und sich damit über strukturelle Zwänge hinwegsetzen zu können. Noch dezidierter sieht es Khong (2002), der dem Akteur als letzte und entscheidende Instanz bei außen-und sicherheitspolitischen Entscheidungen den Vorrang einräumt. Waever (1990, 337) wirft jedoch zu recht ein, dass es bei der Entscheidung zwischen Akteur vs. Struktur nicht darum gehe, sich für eine der beiden Seiten zu entscheiden und das jeweils andere Element auszublenden.…”

Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach

“…This is rather like accusing Kenneth Waltz of being a Wendtian constructivist on the basis of his all too evident preference for “structure,” and even rational choice theorists might qualify as agent‐level constructivists using this definition 21 . Still, while Khong argues convincingly in his reply to Duffy that the latter misunderstood his purpose in writing Analogies At War and mischaracterizes his argument, Khong does not actually dispute the label “constructivist” as a description of his work (Khong 2002).…”