The Aid That Leaves Something to Chance

Walden, Kenneth

doi:10.1086/673438

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“… 2. The soft-pedalled nature of Taurek’s preference for coin flipping is also noted by Walden (2014: 233, n. 2) and Doggett (2014). Doggett rightly identifies an insufficiently precise formulation of Taurek’s commitments that we made in passing in Lang and Lawlor (2013). …”

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confidence: 77%

“… 6. It might be claimed that nature has already shuffled the deck, or – to put it more soberly – that randomization of a non-agential variety has already taken place in the myriad of factors that explain how and why conflict cases arise. (Walden (2014) refers to this process as God’s lottery .) If that is so, there will be no compelling reason to equalize chances of rescue.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism

Lang¹,

Lawlor

2015

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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The 'Standard Interpretation' of John Taurek's argument in 'Should the Numbers Count?' imputes two theses to him: first, 'numbers scepticism', or scepticism about the moral force of an appeal to the mere number of individuals saved in conflict cases; and second, the 'equal greatest chances' principle of rescue, which requires that every individual has an equal chance of being rescued. The Standard Interpretation is criticized here on a number of grounds. First, while Taurek clearly believes that equal chances are all-important, he actually argues for a position weaker than the equal greatest chances principle. Second, the argument Taurek gives for the importance of equal chances ought to commit him to being more hospitable to the significance of numbers than he seems to be.Third, and as a result, Taurek should not have dismissed the significance of numbers, but embraced a form of pluralism instead. Fourth, this result should be welcomed, because pluralism is more plausible than 2 either the equal greatest chances principle or the saving the greater number principle.

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confidence: 77%

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confidence: 99%

Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism

Lang¹,

Lawlor

2015

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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“…But this also doesn't follow: it will depend on the precise details of the selection process. Worse, it's unclear why it would even matter: if we care about chances at all, why does "God's lottery" (Walden 2014), determining who is in the more cost-effective group to aid, not count as random enough? Now, I think these kinds of "fairness" intuitions could be an interesting place for critics of EA to focus, in developing a possible critique of welfarist prioritization.…”

Section: So Then We Must Ask How Reasons Of Justice and Beneficence R...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Not Effective Altruism?

Chappell

2024

Public Affairs Quarterly

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Effective altruism sounds so innocuous—who could possibly be opposed to doing good more effectively? Yet it has inspired significant backlash in recent years. This paper addresses some common misconceptions and argues that the core “beneficentric” ideas of effective altruism are both excellent and widely neglected. Reasonable people may disagree on details of implementation, but all should share the basic goals or values underlying effective altruism.

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“…Nonetheless, in realistic cases the probabilities are likely to be only epistemic, and in some of these a failed attempt will reveal that the epistemic probability was misleading. And yet, even if the flip of a coin (say) 22 See Rasmussen (2012); Taurek (1977); Walden (2014). Thanks here to Christian Barry.…”

Section: The Discount Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Sunk Costs

Lazar

2018

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring-from this point forward-no more cost than it warranted at the outset. If you now succeed, the total cost will exceed the upper bound marked at the beginning. But the additional cost from this point is below that upper bound. And the good you will achieve is undiminished. How do the moral costs you have already inflicted bear upon your decision now?

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The Aid That Leaves Something to Chance

Cited by 7 publications

References 7 publications

Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism

Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism

Why Not Effective Altruism?

Moral Sunk Costs

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