1954
DOI: 10.1119/1.1933818
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The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory

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Cited by 530 publications
(303 citation statements)
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“…In the first, Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1970Kuhn ( , 1996 and Feyerabend (1978) have claimed that observation is theory-laden; that is, our observations are ''coloured'' by our background beliefs and assumptions (and therefore can never be, even under the most ideal circumstances or controlled experimental settings, the unmitigated perception of the nature of things). In the second, Duhem (1982) and Quine (1960) have argued that theories are underdetermined by data. In other words, our theory choices are never determined exclusively by ''the evidence''.…”
Section: Post-positivist Philosophy Of Sciencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the first, Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1970Kuhn ( , 1996 and Feyerabend (1978) have claimed that observation is theory-laden; that is, our observations are ''coloured'' by our background beliefs and assumptions (and therefore can never be, even under the most ideal circumstances or controlled experimental settings, the unmitigated perception of the nature of things). In the second, Duhem (1982) and Quine (1960) have argued that theories are underdetermined by data. In other words, our theory choices are never determined exclusively by ''the evidence''.…”
Section: Post-positivist Philosophy Of Sciencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pierre Duhem (1954) long ago convinced philosophers of science that a scientific hypothesis is never refuted by the evidence. Rather, what is refuted is, even in the simplest cases, the conjunction of the hypothesis with one or more auxiliary hypotheses that concern conditions under which the evidence was produced and observed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…( Duhem, 1906( Duhem, /1991 […] what is called explaining one law of nature by another, is but substituting one mystery for another, and does nothing to render the general course of nature other than mysterious. (Mill, 1891/2002: 310) Duhem clearly deploys a metaphysical concept of explanation 7 ; Mill equally clearly denies that his explanations have any bearing on the metaphysical issue of what really exists.…”
Section: Second Riddle: Positivism and Metaphysicsmentioning
confidence: 99%