The Alleged Opposition Deficit in European Union Politics: Myth or Reality?

Abstract

According to the ‘opposition deficit thesis’ European Union politics is characterized by a conspicuous absence of opposition to the policies promoted by the EU. However, once we start looking for systematic evidence supporting the claim of an opposition deficit in EU politics, we come up surprisingly empty handed. This article seeks to rectify the lacuna in previous research by examining how much and what type of opposition actually exist in EU politics. The study formulates four hypotheses on the state of political opposition in EU politics, and breaks new ground by testing their validity by use of unique data collected from the Swedish European Affairs Committee for the period 1995–2016. The results show there is in fact considerably more opposition present in EU politics than has previously been assumed. The opposition deficit thesis thus seems to be more myth than reality.

Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

“…Furthermore, the current examination improves our understanding of the role that Eurosceptic parties play in EU affairs, by corroborating some results from previous research. In a case study of Sweden, Karlsson and Persson () found a strong dominance of hard Eurosceptic parties when it came to opposition in polity matters, whereas the share of policy opposition was much more evenly distributed between Eurosceptics and mainstream parties. These key results are confirmed by our comparative analysis of opposition in the Danish and Swedish EACs.…”

“…In previous research, political opposition in EU politics has been considered a scarce commodity. This alleged ‘opposition deficit’ (Karlsson & Persson ) is considered to result from a situation where the EU has helped ‘to depoliticize decision‐making at the national level, tending therefore to transform member states to polities without politics’ (Mair , 8). Deprived of alternatives and choice in EU politics, citizens have started to increasingly support parties that oppose the EU political system as such; the absence of policy opposition has thus produced a breeding ground for Euroscepticism and electoral success for Eurosceptic challenger parties (Mair , 139–40).…”

Comparing oppositional behaviour in European Union affairs: empirical evidence from six member states

“…However, opposition is not only about delivering critique it is also, crucially, about presenting alternatives and this key dimension of opposition is not addressed by Hoerner. In another recent article Karlsson and Persson (2018) do address opposition in the form of critique as well as presenting alternatives. Their results imply there exists more opposition in EU politics than what has often been assumed, but since this is a case study of only one member state (Sweden) it fails to provide a general picture of opposition in EU politics.…”

Subsidiarity watchdogs and the kennel of trilogues: when do they bark? The role of National Parliaments in trilogue negotiations

“…A second general theme we can derive from the scholarly literature and that can function as a starting point for our empirical enquiry is the difference between NPs of EU member states in how these representative bodies monitor the progress in EU legislative processes (Karlsson & Persson, 2018;Raunio & Hix, 2000;Winzen, 2012). First, the scope of information rights varies greatly between parliaments, with some having only weak, informal or incomplete access to EU documents, parliaments receiving all legislative proposals that fall within their remit of responsibility, and other parliaments with rights to hold hearings and access additional background material (Winzen, 2012).…”

“…As a result, NPs were often labelled as 'victims' or 'latecomers' to the European integration process (Auel & Benz, 2005;O'Brennan & Raunio, 2007;Raunio, 2011). The discrepancy between the need for parliamentary control at the national level and the inability of NPs to control the national executive branch in the complex EU legislative process seriously undermines the legitimacy of the representative democratic system in Europe, with de-parliamentarization as a result (Maurer & Wessels, 2001; but see Karlsson & Persson, 2018).…”