The Allocation of Funds to Small Cities under the Community Development Block Grant Program An Evaluation

Isserman, Andrew M.

doi:10.1080/01944368108977085

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…These cities must compete for the funds, and most receive considerably less money than inner cities compared to their needs. Isserman (1981) demonstrated that suburbs received only seven percent of CDBG funding in 1980, whereas they include 14 percent of the people living below the level of poverty, 16 percent of the overcrowded housing, and 14 percent of older housing units. Cities received 62 percent of the funds for 39 percent of the population below the level of poverty.…”

Section: Representation Of An Urban Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

In the blind spot: the federal government’s intervention in the housing crisis in suburban California

Lefebvre¹

2015

CJPP

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The federal government responded to the foreclosures crisis by implementing several policies. The Neighborhood Stabilization program (NSP) in 2009, a mitigation policy, aimed at helping local governments to buy, rehabilitate and sell foreclosed homes to mitigate the effects of the foreclosures in the most affected neighborhoods. This paper focuses on the allocation methodology used in this program to explain why some of the most affected places in California didn't receive adequate funds to fight foreclosures. The initial version of the NSP targeted mainly the largest cities, but left suburban municipalities-yet deeply affected by the foreclosures-with reduced or delayed funds. The use of estimations of foreclosures number to allocate the money, as well as the lack of cooperation between suburban local governments also participated to inefficiently allocate the NSP money, and suggests that urban policies need to be adapted to better fit the change of urban structure in the US.

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Section: Representation Of An Urban Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

In the blind spot: the federal government’s intervention in the housing crisis in suburban California

Lefebvre¹

2015

CJPP

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“…This finding makes sense in light of our framework because both pre‐1981 HUD and post‐1981 state administration use some form of competitive grant contracting. Isserman (1981) found that need was generally ignored in HUD’s administration, and Watson’s (1992, 1993) studies of Oklahoma suggest that state administration may be targeting median income populations to the exclusion of poor communities. These findings are consistent with the proposition that reliance on grant competitions may bias outputs toward greater administrative capacity.…”

Section: Social Equity In State‐administered Cdbg Programsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taken for Granted? Managing for Social Equity in Grant Programs

Collins

Gerber

2008

Public Administration Review

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Managing for social equity performance has long been a goal without much guidance for public managers. We examine social equity performance in the context of indirect governance through the administration of grant programs and, more specifically, the matching of policy responses (grant funding) to social needs. Grant program managers must allocate funding to match needs while also ensuring accountability, but common administrative models that rely on competition can undermine social equity performance. We develop a unique framework to analyze the relative social equity performance of four models of grant administration in general. These models are defined by whether competitions or formulas are used to select grantees and to allocate funding. We test the implications of the framework in an analysis of funding distributions from the nonentitlement Community Development Block Grant program in four states. Our findings suggest that social equity in grant programs is better served when grantors do not rely solely on competitive grant contracting in the selection and distribution of grant funds, which is typical in grant administration. However, policy makers and managers can design institutional arrangements that utilize competition, but in a manner that does not create a bias against more socially equitable funding decisions.

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“…There is, of course, the much broader body of literature that examines the policy and distributive aspects of CDBG generally. At the risk of doing substantial violence to this literature, we believe that it can be categorized according to the following themes: I) intergovernmental relations and decision processes affecting CDBG distributions (Nathan, 1978;Hall, 1983;Liebschutz, 1983); 2) the adequacy of definitions of community need and of federal distribution formulae and the equity of the allocation of CDBG funds (Lovell, 1983;Dommel, 1980Dommel, , 1982; 3) program impacts, innovation, and evaluation (Isserman, 1981;Morgan, 1983). We find that this first theme provides a useful starting point and a convenient framework for investigating county CDBG.…”

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confidence: 99%

Community Development Blocks Grants in Urban Counties: The Case of Hamilton County, Ohio

Ellison

Stever

1986

Journal of Urban Affairs

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Urban counties must struggle with metropolitan expansion in order to deliver vital urban services. With the passage of the Housing and Community Development Act, urban counties throughout the nation found it necessary to develop the administrative capacity and the intergovernmental network sufficient to implement the Act. Hamilton County, Ohio, offers a typical example of how an urban county implemented CDBG. The result was a small county community development staff that look a pragmatic approach and relied heavily on the recommendations of participating municipalities and townships. The funded projects were primarily oriented toward transportation and public works. These projects, widely dispersed throughout the county, rewarded diverse political interests, generated few political conflicts, and required minimal county staff resources.

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The Allocation of Funds to Small Cities under the Community Development Block Grant Program An Evaluation

Cited by 8 publications

References 13 publications

In the blind spot: the federal government’s intervention in the housing crisis in suburban California

In the blind spot: the federal government’s intervention in the housing crisis in suburban California

Taken for Granted? Managing for Social Equity in Grant Programs

Community Development Blocks Grants in Urban Counties: The Case of Hamilton County, Ohio

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