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AbstractThe standard neoclassical approach to economic theorizing excludes, by definition, economic emergence and the related phenomenon of entrepreneurship. We explore how the most economic of human behaviours, entrepreneurship, came to be largely excluded from mainstream economic theory. In contrast, we report that evolutionary economists have acknowledged the importance of understanding emergence and we explore the advances that have been made in this regard. We go on to argue that evolutionary economics can make further progress by taking a more naturalistic approach to economic evolution. This requires that economic analysis be fully embedded in complex economic system theory and that associated understandings as to how humans react to states of uncertainty be explicitly dealt with. We argue that knowledge, because of the existence of uncertainty is, to a large degree conjectural and, thus, is closely linked to our emotional states. Our economic behaviour is also influenced by the reality that we, and the systems that we create, are dissipative structures. Thus, we introduce the notions of energy gradients and knowledge gradients as essential concepts in understanding economic emergence and resultant economic growth.* The authors are very grateful to David Harper for his comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.#1112 2
IntroductionConventional neoclassical economics has at its core the presumption that economic decision making is a matter of cold logic, namely, the application of a constrained optimisation rule. Over the past three decades, this rule has become set, increasingly, in the context of strategic interactions although much of macroeconomics continues to apply it in the context of a single representative agent. Despite the analytical precision that such a rule provides, it can only approximate actual behaviour in historical time when there is either certainty or quantifiable risk, i.e., in simplistic contexts (Foster (2005)). It can only be used to calculate from calculable information. It cannot approximate economic decision-making when there is uncertainty, i.e., the absence of knowledge of the full set of events faced and the probabilities associated with them. Significant technological, organizational or institutional changes occur in states of uncertainty and, furthermore, these changes, in turn, can create new uncertainties in an economic system. This uncertain...