The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes: A Conceptual Framework

Forging, Bending, and Breaking: Enacting the “Illiberal Playbook” in Hungary and Poland

“…To explain what we mean by an illiberal turn, we must first characterise what it is a turning away from. Magyar and Madlovics (2020, 9) have argued against the uncritical application of Western-derived measures of democratisation—and its reverse-teleological counterpart, autocratisation (Cassani and Tomini 2018)—to the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They contend that these political systems are dominated by “informal and personal relations”—such as the dismantling of the separation of branches of power—are in reality simply “a logical adjustment of formal institutions to patronalism.” Their call for an alternative framework for analysis also carries a set of implicit hypotheses about the greater vulnerability of post-communist systems to what, from the perspective of Western liberal democratic benchmarks, constitutes democratic erosion.…”

“…Three decades after the transition from democracy, it remains unclear to what extent other post-communist countries are succumbing to this “logical adjustment” and indeed to what extent the “predominant framing” (Dawson and Hanley 2019, 6) of democratic backsliding is applicable at all. Furthermore, the emergence of populist parties and concomitant challenges to the integrity of democratic Western European democracies challenges the stark distinction Magyar and Madlovics (2020, 8) draw between “Western” and “Eastern” civilisations with respect to the regulation and operation of political systems. Accordingly, our conceptual point of departure is the common set of liberal-democratic principles—the “obligatory syntax of political thought” (Crăiuţu cited in Trencsényi et al 2018, 209)—on which the post-1989 political order was founded, and whose normative superiority was, at least at the time, accepted by the majority of political actors.…”

Populism unrestrained: Policy responses of the Orbán regime to the pandemic in 2020–2021

“…The pandemic did not only provide a pretext for further curtailing the rule of law but also widened the opportunities for corrupt practices enhancing the crony-capitalist features of the Hungarian political economy (cf. Magyar & Madlovics, 2020). This is also highlighted by the fact that 22% of the total contract value of all Hungarian public procurement tenders in 2020 and 2021 was awarded to 42 companies owned by 12 business owners having close friendly relations with the prime minister and his inner circle of friends.…”

The middle-income trap in Central and Eastern Europe in the 2010s: institutions and divergent growth models

“…This can be explained by the fact that between 1990 and 2015 successive governments built a system committed to free market and capitalism, which kept the country on a steady growth path. As Magyar and Madlovics ( 2020 : 650–651) explain, even after 2015 the economy was mostly left intact and loyal members of the ruling party are rewarded by office and not wealth. It is a very different case from Hungary even with a similar rule of law deterioration.…”

“…For a comparative perspective of the transformation of the Hungarian political regime see f. ex. Győrffy ( 2020 ) or Magyar and Madlovics ( 2020 ).…”