The Arm’s Length Principle and Tacit Collusion

Choe, Chongwoo; Matsushima, Noriaki

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1986387

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…This match, which has since come to be known as the 'Shame of Gijon', is an example of tacit collusion (Anderson et al, 2015;Fonseca and Normann, 2012;Choe and Matsushima, 2013), which has some similarities with evolving cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984;Li et al, 2011;Li and Kendall, 2014), which has been an active field of research for over 30 years, and has strong links with the pioneering work of Nash (1950Nash ( , 1951 in Game Theory.…”

Section: June 1982 -Austria Vs West Germany El Molinón Stadium Gmentioning

confidence: 99%

When sports rules go awry

Kendall

Lenten

2017

European Journal of Operational Research

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Mike Wright (Wright, M. OR analysis of sporting rules -A survey. European Journal of Operational Research, 232(1):1-8, 2014 ) recently presented a survey of sporting rules from an Operational Research (OR) perspective. He surveyed 21 sports, which consider the rules of sports and tournaments and whether changes have led to unintended consequences. The paper concludes: "Overall, it would seem that this is just a taster and there may be plenty more such studies to come". In this paper we present one such study. This is an interdisciplinary paper, which cuts across economics, sport and operational research (OR). We recognize that the paper could have been published in any of these disciplines but for the sake of continuity with the paper that motivated this study, we wanted to publish this paper in an OR journal. We look at specific examples where the rules of sports have led to unforeseen and/or unwanted consequences. We hope that the paper will be especially useful to sports administrators, helping them to review what has not previously worked and also encouraging them to engage with the scientific community when considering making changes.We believe that this is the first time that such a comprehensive review of sporting rules, which have led to unexpected consequences, has been published in the scientific literature.

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Section: June 1982 -Austria Vs West Germany El Molinón Stadium Gmentioning

confidence: 99%

When sports rules go awry

Kendall

Lenten

2017

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…7 For subsequent developments, see Nielsen et al (2008), Choe andMatsushima (2013), andYao (2013). 8 In many studies dealing with asymmetric tax rates, country asymmetry results from differences in market size (Stöwhase, 2005(Stöwhase, , 2013.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Integration and Agglomeration of Multinational Production With Transfer Pricing

Kato

Okoshi

2022

Int Economic Review

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Do low corporate taxes always favor multinational production over economic integration? We propose a two-country model in which multinationals choose the locations of production plants and foreign distribution affiliates and shift profits between them through transfer prices. With high trade costs, plants are concentrated in the low-tax country; surprisingly, this pattern reverses with low trade costs. Indeed, economic integration has a nonmonotonic impact: Falling trade costs first decrease and then increase the plant share in the high-tax country, which we empirically confirm. Moreover, allowing for transfer pricing makes tax competition tougher and international coordination on transfer-pricing regulation can be beneficial.

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“…Most studies of upstream collusion focus on the incentive issue, that is, a cartel needs to ensure that no member wants to break away from the collusive agreement (Choe and Matsushima, ; Jullien and Rey, ; Piccolo and Reisinger, ; Nocke and White, , ). We, on the contrary, address the profitability issue of collusion with compensation consideration, setting aside the usual incentive constraint.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When is upstream collusion profitable?

Yao

Zhou

et al. 2019

The RAND J of Economics

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Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long‐term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.

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The Arm’s Length Principle and Tacit Collusion

Cited by 10 publications

References 25 publications

When sports rules go awry

When sports rules go awry

Economic Integration and Agglomeration of Multinational Production With Transfer Pricing

When is upstream collusion profitable?

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