The Art of Concession in General Lotto Games

Chandan, Rahul; Paarporn, Keith; Kovenock, Dan; Alizadeh, Mahnoosh; Marden, Jason R.

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-23141-4_23

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 23 publications

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“…In comparison, our work provides explicit, analytical characterizations of equilibrium strategies, which draws sharper insights that relate the players' performance with the various elements of adversarial interaction. As such, our work is related to a recent research thread in which allocation decisions are made over multiple stages [4], [9], [10], [17], [19], [23], [26], [29].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing pre-commitment strategies in General Lotto games

Paarporn

Chandan

Kovenock

et al. 2023

2023 American Control Conference (ACC)

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Strategic decisions are often made over multiple periods of time, wherein decisions made earlier impact a competitor's success in later stages. In this paper, we study these dynamics in General Lotto games, a class of models describing the competitive allocation of resources between two opposing players. We propose a two-stage formulation where one of the players has reserved resources that can be strategically pre-allocated across the battlefields in the first stage of the game as reinforcements. The players then simultaneously allocate their remaining real-time resources, which can be randomized, in a decisive final stage. Our main contributions provide complete characterizations of the optimal reinforcement strategies and resulting equilibrium payoffs in these multi-stage General Lotto games. Interestingly, we determine that real-time resources are at least twice as effective as reinforcement resources when considering equilibrium payoffs.

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