The ASEAN Regional Security Partnership

East Meets West

“…260 Notably, the collapse of ASA and the failure to launch MAPHILINDO was symptomatic of weak processes built not on convergence of interests, but of one trying to put its interest more than the other. 261 While this phenomenon may be explained by cultural undertones and differently formed perceptions, this could be equally observed in the beginning of regional discussions in Southeast Asia such as the Bandung Conference and NAM, wherein, amidst the free-flowing informal discussions that were able to dilute any attempt at dominance by any participant, one could observe how Sukarno-led Indonesia tried to dominate discussions through the imposition of its own agenda and ideals, and how a Nehru-led India thought itself and its ideas more superior than others while attempting to talk down those which did not conform to its ideas. 262 As experiences from these failures suggest, political and military interests should be taken out of the negotiation table during the formative years of learning cooperation; goodwill and trust are imperative; and Asian solutions for Asian problems should be applied in preserving peace.…”

“…278 As former Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Adam Malik noted, national and regional security loomed in the minds of the ASEAN founding fathers. 279 In particular, there was a need to address the intervention of superpowers in the Southeast Asian region that aggravated localized conflicts as well as the re-integration of Indonesia in the region after the ousting of its former dictator-Prime Minister Sukarno and cessation of Konfrontasi. 280 However, the Bangkok Declaration intentionally downplayed political and security matters to avoid it being viewed as a defense pact or military alliance, or a threat that favors one side over another, or an arena for the "quarrels of the strong."…”

“…282 Furthermore, the ASEAN was viewed to serve to ease tensions amongst its member states, limit competition, and be able to produce tangible outcomes. 283 As early as the Bangkok Declaration, there was emphasis amongst the member states, like in the Bandung Conference, on consultation and consensus-based decision-making. 284 Both ASPAC and ASEAN were then viewed as complementary forms of indigenous regionalism.…”

“…476 Thus, the ASEAN has not been historically fond of binding treaties for collective action, and there is absence of coercive instruments that make members comply with principles. 477 Regional cooperation's elaboration is by small, incremental steps, wherein member states work together on the basis of formal and informal structures as well as voluntary and informal arrangements which might eventually lead to more binding and institutionalized agreements. 478 In this respect, it is not surprising to find different forms of agreements in the purview of the ASEAN -principal agreements (treaties/arrangements/memoranda of understanding), declarations, ministerial statements, protocols, and secondary protocols -the majority of which are declarations or normative statements on common objectives without exactly imposing a legal obligation.…”

“…481 Interestingly, such flexible institutional design of the ASEAN greatly reflects its historical circumstances marked by the need to consolidate the independence of post-colonial states. 482 And in light of this, the ASEAN mirrors to a degree, if not completely, neo-liberal institutionalism on how it structures social action: institutions could become effective guides to social action not only by making use of incentives and sanctions but also in terms of owning one's roles, rituals, duties, and obligations that do not necessarily follow a Western model. 483 The general characteristics of the ASEAN as a regional organization are easily carried over to its external relations.…”