The association between political orientation and political knowledge in 45 nations

De keersmaecker, Jonas; Schmid, Katharina; Sibley, Chris G.; Osborne, Danny

doi:10.1038/s41598-024-53114-z

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…The idea would be to rely on distant connections (at least two steps away) with more moderate groups of center-right and center-left individuals, respectively, to provide fact-checks. Center-left and center-right individuals have been found to be less susceptible to misinformation than their more extreme counterparts (Guess et al, 2019) and more knowledgeable about politics than people in the middle and at the extremes of the political spectrum (De Keersmaecker et al, 2024). Thus, center-left and center-right individuals could help provide more accurate fact-checks to isolated parts of the network that may be hard to reach through centralists.…”

Section: Crowd Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This would cause center-right and center-left individuals to receive fewer fact-checks from neighboring communities of more center-leaning moderates on one side and, respectively, far-right and farleft partisans on the other side. This may not be particularly detrimental, because center-left and center-right voters are less susceptible to misinformation (Guess et al, 2019) and more politically knowledgeable than people at the extremes and center of the political spectrum (De keersmaecker et al, 2024). Thus, these groups may benefit less from fact-checking than more extreme groups.…”

Section: Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Scaling crowdsourcing interventions to combat partisan misinformation

Pretus,

Gil-Buitrago,

Cisma

et al. 2024

Preprint

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Partisan misinformation hijacks people’s right to make decisions based on accurate information, posing a threat to democracy and liberal values. Current interventions to counter misinformation are less effective when it comes to politically polarizing content, especially among extreme partisans who share the most misinformation. A new line of research suggests that crowdsourcing interventions, or using laypeople’s judgments to help people spot misinformation, provide an additional layer of content moderation that can help overcome these limitations. We present a model that explains when crowdsourcing interventions will be successful based on three factors: trust in fact-checking sources, dissonance with previous beliefs, and crowd size. These three factors are often at odds in politically polarized social media environments, leading to less effective fact-checking. Based on this model, we discuss how crowdsourcing interventions could be scaled in a way that is ethical and leverages artificial intelligence to connect people with neighboring communities outside their ideological echo chambers. Finally, we propose venues for future research in the field of crowdsourcing interventions that lie at the intersection between individual-level and system-level solutions to partisan misinformation.

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Section: Crowd Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaling crowdsourcing interventions to combat partisan misinformation

Pretus,

Gil-Buitrago,

Cisma

et al. 2024

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…However, outside of W.E.I.R.D. cultural contexts, political ideology is much more flexible and is influenced by the unique values, cultural contexts, and historical experiences of each nation (De Keersmaecker et al, 2024;Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022). Using data from 99 countries, including underrepresented countries from the Global South, Malka et al (2019) found that purely left-right ideological distinctions are less normative outside of W.E.I.R.D.…”

Section: Ideology In Non-western Contexts Around the Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

Left and right ideological orientations as intragroup strategies of cultural preservation and promotion

Reyna,

Vazquez,

Vazquez

et al. 2024

Social & Personality Psych

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Social and political psychologists have focused on how liberals and conservatives differ from one another and have developed a vast literature on individual differences and fixed attributes that distinguish ideological groups. However, ideological orientations might be more contextual and flexible than what is often portrayed in research. We present a novel look at ideological variability as an intragroup phenomenon that makes liberals and conservatives nuanced, heterogeneous, and more similar to one another—important perspectives for reducing ideological stereotyping and polarization. In this paper, we review patterns showing ideological variability and overlap in thinking, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors across the lifespan, geographical regions, status groups, and diverse cultures around the world. By understanding the social psychological and situational factors associated with intragroup variability in ideology, we can develop more culturally inclusive models of ideology and map out better solutions to polarization.

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Racial microaggressions in U.S. and Canadian contexts: Identity, perceptions of severity and the use of mindset signalling to repair harm

Jenkins,

Obhi

2024

J Applied Social Pyschol

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Microaggressions are behaviours constituting indirect or unintentional discrimination, but little is known about how group identity affects perceptions of their harm. Canada and the United States have similar socio‐cultural backgrounds, but different socio‐political climates, with greater political polarisation and arguably stronger ties between politics and race in the United States (Pew research, 2020). Thus, the interplay between ethnic/racial identity (ERI), political identity, and perceived harm of microaggressions may differ across these countries. In a recent study of Canadians, perceived microaggression harm was associated with leftward political orientation rather than ERI. Here, we extend this work to a U.S. sample. In two experiments (N = 99; N = 210), White participants and Participants of Colour rated the severity of microaggressions and reported their political orientation and the strength of their ERI. Microaggression severity ratings were associated with left‐leaning political orientation, regardless of ERI. In Experiment 2, vignettes in which the perpetrator of a microaggression sought reparation by signalling a “reparatory open‐mindedness” reduced severity ratings compared to instances in which the source doubled down on the microaggression. Interestingly, the size of this reduction in perceived severity was smaller than for Canadian participants. Thus, perceived microaggression harm is governed by similar forces in Canada and the United States, but signalling mindset, while still effective, leads to smaller reductions in perceived harm in the United States. This could indicate differences in intergroup trust and polarization between these nations. This work underscores the role of political orientation in perceptions of microaggressions and highlights the efficacy of mindset signalling in mitigating their harm.

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The association between political orientation and political knowledge in 45 nations

Cited by 3 publications

References 39 publications

Scaling crowdsourcing interventions to combat partisan misinformation

Scaling crowdsourcing interventions to combat partisan misinformation

Left and right ideological orientations as intragroup strategies of cultural preservation and promotion

Racial microaggressions in U.S. and Canadian contexts: Identity, perceptions of severity and the use of mindset signalling to repair harm

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