The battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914: South African military reform and the German South-West Africa campaign, 1914–1915

Waag, Ian Van der

doi:10.1080/19475020.2013.828633

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Much of what its army required to function would be cobbled together on an ad hoc basis once the leadership in Pretoria made a decision to go to war and the force would have to catch up when the time for battle came. 12 Prior to World War I, military intelligence was still a primitive art form and those who practiced it were often unappreciated by the officers and men of the line. To many, the work was considered unsuitable for professional officers, and those who were in that field were often thought to be incapable of commanding combat troops.…”

Section: Prelude To Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Go Spy Out the Land: Intelligence Preparations for World War I in South West Africa

J¹

2017

SCIM

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As World War I approached, the potential for conflict drove the principal future protagonists, England and Germany, to seek detailed information on their anticipated enemies, not just in Europe, but wherever their nations' interests crossed paths. After 1910, the Union of South Africa turned its eyes to the northwest to keep watch on its German neighbour in the colonial protectorate of Deutsch-Südwest-afrika. For South Africans of English descent, the question of Germany's intentions was especially important: the Kaiser's vow of support for the Afrikaners prior to the recently concluded Boer War of Independence (South African War) was still remembered with some trepidation, despite its bombastic nature.1 Despite this, neither side was prepared for war outside Europe. The study on which this article reports, investigated the role intelligence played in the African theatre of the conflict, specifically the South West African campaign, and how this affected the preparation, conduct, and final outcome of the war for both the Allies and the Germans. While few records of the missions undertaken or the intelligence produced survive to describe intelligence operations in detail, enough exists to paint a picture of the efforts undertaken during the war. The activities of English defence attachés, German Schutztruppe officers on leave, South African Scouts, as well as alleged spies were examined and we demonstrate here that military intelligence operationswhere successfully undertaken -provided policy makers and military leaders alike with the information necessary for the prosecution of the war.

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Section: Prelude To Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Go Spy Out the Land: Intelligence Preparations for World War I in South West Africa

J¹

2017

SCIM

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“…Johan Leipoldt, a Namakwalander, and Thomas Cullinan, who had prospected in the Kuruman area. 26 The speed with which government looked to invade GSWA meant that a combination of systems and processes was used, resulting in apparent confusion and a lack of organisation. 27 The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in Durban was mobilised on 5 August, whilst the Natal units of the Defence Force, including the Durban Light Infantry and Natal Carbineers, mobilised on 8 August to protect against coastal invasion and to relieve the Imperial garrison, which left Durban on 12 August 1914 for Cape Town.…”

Section: Planning the Campaign And Protecting The Unionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…on 26 September 1914, and asked how long it would take to raise a mounted regiment: a month if he could use a squadron of South African Police and Southern Rifles from the Transkei where he was based. Smuts approved -On leaving Defence HQ, I went to see the Commissioner of Police, Smuts's Secretary had already telephoned him and the Minister for Justice, and my immediate secondment for Active Service was approved.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

South Africa Mobilises: The First Five Months of the War

Samson¹

2017

SCIM

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When war broke out in August 1914, the Union of South Africa found itself unprepared for what lay ahead. When the Imperial garrison left the Union during September 1914, supplies, equipment and a working knowledge of British military procedures reduced considerably. South Africa was, in effect, left starting from scratch. Yet, within five months and despite having to quell a rebellion, the Union was able to field an expeditionary force to invade German South West Africa and within a year agree to send forces to Europe and East Africa. This article explores how the Union Defence Force came of age in 1914.

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“…10 , 1914-1918: Official History (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1924; J.J. Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914-1915(Government Printer, Pretoria, 1937 Campaign and World War I in South West Africa, 1914-1915(Helion, Solihull, 2014 The participation of indigenous African people in the campaign in GSWA remains an under-researched theme. Whereas there is considerable focus on the role of the South African Native Labour Contingent and the Cape Coloured Corps 12 in South Africa's First World War campaigns in German East Africa, France and Palestine, the participation of Africans, Coloureds and Indians in GSWA requires further research.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Airpower in the Union of South Africa's First World War campaign in German South West Africa

García¹

2017

Historia

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During the Great War, aircraft were used primarily for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. The Union of South Africa's First World War campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) allowed for South Africa's first employment of military aeroplanes in conventional warfare. The creation and employment of the South African Aviation Corps (SAAC) within the Union Defence Force (UDF) provided ground forces with a substantial force multiplier in terms of forward reconnaissance. The aerial reconnaissance allowed General Louis Botha and his subordinate commanders to gain a better understanding of the tactical picture and facilitated the battle concept. This paper discusses the role and impact of aerial operations during the GSWA campaign. The campaign was characterised by sweeping envelopments which were executed by the Union's commandos. During the latter part of the campaign aeroplanes provided the UDF with intelligence in terms of the location and concentration of German forces, which assisted in their final encirclement. Keywords

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The battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914: South African military reform and the German South-West Africa campaign, 1914–1915

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

Go Spy Out the Land: Intelligence Preparations for World War I in South West Africa

Go Spy Out the Land: Intelligence Preparations for World War I in South West Africa

South Africa Mobilises: The First Five Months of the War

Airpower in the Union of South Africa's First World War campaign in German South West Africa

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