The Belief Norm of Academic Publishing

Abstract

The belief norm of academic publishing states that researchers should believe certain claims they publish. The purpose of this paper is to defend the belief norm of academic publishing. In its defense, the advantages and disadvantages of the belief norm are evaluated for academic research and for the publication system. It is concluded that while the norm does not come without costs, academic research systemically benefits from the belief norm and that it should be counted among those that sustain the practice of academic publishing.

Philosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review

“…That's also the reason why anything that threatens the extent to which we can trust one another threatens our capacity to produce truth and understanding. Hoaxes risk undermining the epistemic trust we have in one another (Buckwalter, 2023). Since they are damaging, and might be prevented by an increase in vigilance when we review, there's a prima facie case for reviewers becoming more suspicious.…”

Publishing, Belief, and Self-Trust

“…I agree that the case is problematic, and the worry that PWB opens the door to hoaxing or ‘trolling’ journals is a serious one. As Buckwalter (Forthcoming) writes, “there is probably no quicker way to undermine public trust in research than to normalize the publishing of papers hoaxing it.”…”

“…For example, Buckwalter draws on the involuntariness of belief to support BWP: since we don't control our beliefs, and beliefs are formed “respective of truth-conducive considerations,” the fact that we believe something is prima facie evidence for truth: “if belief aims at truth, and belief is the norm of academic publishing, then it follows that published claims will be more likely informed by truth-conducive considerations than those that are published but not believed … the fact that one believes a proposition is always at least some evidence for its truth.” Here, the thought is that belief is an involuntary response to evidence for truth, so requiring belief “increases the likelihood that fewer false claims are made” (Buckwalter Forthcoming: 5). It's true that requiring a BNP makes it more likely that authors will fulfill their duties, because as we saw above, belief tends to correlate with the behaviors we expect of authors (defending their claims, pursuing them further, being accountable for them).…”

“…Discussions of PWB so far (see especially Plakias (2019) and Buckwalter (Forthcoming), particularly his discussion of qualifying claims) seem to be using confidence in an epistemic sense, where confidence is a matter of apportioning or calibrating our degrees of belief. On this view, confidence is an epistemic attitude; a relationship between an agent and her belief.…”

“…In an earlier paper (Plakias 2019), I defend a view called, ‘publishing without belief’ (PWB), according to which there is no norm requiring that authors believe what they publish. Responses have ranged from outright denial of this view and advocacy of a belief norm for publication (Buckwalter Forthcoming), to modifying my original claim and allowing for some cases of PWB but not others (Fleisher 2020; Sarıhan 2022).…”