The belief problem for moral error theory

Abstract

Moral error theorists think that moral judgments such as 'stealing is morally wrong' express truth-apt beliefs that ascribe moral properties to objects and actions. They also think that moral properties are not instantiated. Since moral error theorists think that moral judgments can only be true if they correctly describe moral properties, they think that no moral judgment is true. The belief problem for moral error theory is that this theory is inconsistent with every plausible theory of belief. I argue that moral error theorists can solve the belief problem. My argument is twofold. First, the belief problem rests on a false presupposition about how moral error theorists reason over time. Once we get clear on how would-be error theorists in fact reason towards the error theory and how, once they are error theorists, they subsequently reason about what they should do with their erroneous moral thought and talk, the belief problem evaporates. Second, even if my first argument fails and error theorists do face the belief problem, then we can still identify a plausible theory of belief that is consistent with moral error theory.

Ethical Subjectivism: A Lost Cause

“…As W. F. Kalf writes, 'If an agent becomes aware of sufficient evidence against a certain belief B, then this agent cannot possibly continue to accept belief B' (Kalf 2019: 12). Also, Kalf (2019) writes, 'Doxastic Involuntarism is inconsistent with the … commitment that you can continue to accept your moral beliefs if you accept that there is sufficient evidence for the falsehood of our basic moral beliefs' (6,12). The implication of doxastic involuntarism applies to Park's non-cognitivist theory, as well.…”

Quietist metaethical realism and moral determination

“…Revolutionary expressivists and revolutionary fictionalists add a non‐cognitivist semantics to an anti‐realist metaphysics where, as error theorists, they used to accept a cognitivist, truth‐apt semantics. Thus, this entire debate is premised on the assumption that we can pick and choose our moral semantics on the back of our prior commitments about moral metaphysics (Kalf, 2019).…”