2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2005.00208.x
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The Blameworthiness of Health and Safety Rule Violations*

Abstract: Man

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Cited by 20 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…But adaptation is especially likely in connection with social controls and the control of social elements of system vulnerability. Much of what we know about counterproductive adaptation to risk controls involves the use of organizational rules in particular . In the security context, many modes of attack are largely technical, involving vulnerabilities and associated exploits in specific software and hardware components.…”
Section: A Brief Review Of the Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…But adaptation is especially likely in connection with social controls and the control of social elements of system vulnerability. Much of what we know about counterproductive adaptation to risk controls involves the use of organizational rules in particular . In the security context, many modes of attack are largely technical, involving vulnerabilities and associated exploits in specific software and hardware components.…”
Section: A Brief Review Of the Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Much of what we know about counterproductive adaptation to risk controls involves the use of organizational rules in particular. (51,(57)(58)(59)(60) In the security context, many modes of attack are largely technical, involving vulnerabilities and associated exploits in specific software and hardware components. Yet many modes of attack involve "social engineering," (61) for which social controls are often the most important and sometimes the only feasible form of risk mitigation.…”
Section: The Adaptation Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whilst this adds some useful notions to model 1, particularly in distinguishing routine violations from the rest, it does not incorporate or clarify all of the issues addressed in table 1. Mascini (2005) charts the self-perpetuating cycle of violation characterised by the existence of rules which are hard to follow if production is to be achieved and are seen as simply covering the backs of 3.1.2. Organisational complicity management in case something goes wrong; this engenders at worst the enticement by supervisors of workers to breach the rules to achieve production, or at least turning a blind eye to violations (see also HFRG 1995), accompanied often by a breach by the supervisors themselves of the same rules if the enticement fails, which, in turn contributes to the reluctance by those supervisors to report or discipline violations by others of rules they also violate.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What sets these regulated sectors apart is that many of the standards and rules are imposed from outside the organization (often ultimately devised by external consultants; Le Gales and Scott, 2010), which means that aspects of them may lack legitimacy in the eyes of managers and workers alike and be poorly aligned to the realities of day-to-day practice (Mascini, 2005). Given the complexity of care, and the unpredictability of some older adults, the rigid adherence to standardized guidelines is at times not in the interests of the latter, and can conflict with the personal values of the care worker (Carlsson-Wall et al, 2011).…”
Section: Rule Breaking and The Care Sectormentioning
confidence: 99%