The Body of Evidence: What Can Neuroscience Tell Us about Embodied Semantics?

Abstract

Semantic knowledge is based on the way we perceive and interact with the world. However, the jury is still out on the question: to what degree are neuronal systems that subserve acquisition of semantic knowledge, such as sensory-motor networks, involved in its representation and processing? We will begin with a critical evaluation of the main behavioral and neuroimaging methods with respect to their capability to define the functional roles of specific brain areas. Any behavioral or neuroscientific measure is a conflation of representations and processes. Hence, a combination of behavioral and neurophysiological interactions as well as time-course information is required to define the functional roles of brain areas. This will guide our review of the empirical literature. Most research in this area has been done on semantics of concrete words, where clear theoretical frameworks for an involvement of sensory-motor systems in semantics exist. Most of this evidence still stems from correlational studies that are ambiguous with respect to the behavioral relevance of effects. Evidence for causal effects of sensory-motor systems on semantic processes is still scarce but evolving. Relatively few neuroscientific studies so far have investigated the embodiment of abstract semantics for words, numbers, and arithmetic facts. Here, some correlational evidence exists, but data on causality are mostly absent. We conclude that neuroimaging data, just as behavioral data, have so far not disentangled the fundamental link between process and representation. Future studies should therefore put more emphasis on the effects of task and context on semantic processing. Strong conclusions can only be drawn from a combination of methods that provide time-course information, determine the connectivity among poly- or amodal and sensory-motor areas, link behavioral with neuroimaging measures, and allow causal inferences. We will conclude with suggestions on how this could be accomplished in future research.

Knowledge is power: How conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

“…Moving forward, it is probably more useful to ask to what degree concepts are embodied (Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013), under what circumstances they are embodied, and how this varies between individuals. It has been shown that the degree to which concepts are embodied varies from person to person depending on object-related experience (Beilock, Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum, & Small, 2008; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Hoenig et al, 2011).…”

A Defense of an Amodal Number System

“…This would undermine strong versions of the grounded approach (e.g., [7,47,48]), which claim that modality-specific systems are necessary and sufficient to support conceptual processing [49]. It is relevant to notice that many grounded theorists currently endorse a weak version of the approach, which claims that concept-related tasks require both modality-specific and modality-independent structure [3,[50][51][52][53][54][55]. Barsalou has recently claimed that strong versions constitute a usual distortion of grounded cognition [3].…”

Where is the humor in verbal irony?

“…More recent studies within psycholinguistics and cognitive neuroscience, however, suggest that online utterance interpretation often engages wide "webs of meaning" including various sensorimotor and emotional associations (Gibbs 2006;Hauk and Tschentscher 2013;Newcombe et al 2012). It is possible, then, that humor responses may be elicited quite quickly in discourse, and indeed, can sometimes arise before people process a speaker's complete verbal utterance.…”