2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-16745-9_16
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The Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE and BLAKE2

Abstract: Abstract. In this paper, we study the security margins of hash functions BLAKE and BLAKE2 against the boomerang attack. We launch boomerang attacks on all four members of BLAKE and BLAKE2, and compare their complexities. We propose 8.5-round boomerang attacks on both BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b with complexities 2 464 and 2 474 respectively. We also propose 8-round attacks on BLAKE-256 with complexity 2 198 and 7.5-round attacks on BLAKE2s with complexity 2 184 . We verify the correctness of our analysis by giving p… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…To assess the security of Blake and Blake2 hashing algorithms, the authors of Reference [7] used a boomerang attack and compare their complexity. Towards this goal, the authors proposed using a 7.5 round-based boomerang attack on Blake2s with a complexity of 2 184 .…”
Section: Computational Complexity Of Blake2mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To assess the security of Blake and Blake2 hashing algorithms, the authors of Reference [7] used a boomerang attack and compare their complexity. Towards this goal, the authors proposed using a 7.5 round-based boomerang attack on Blake2s with a complexity of 2 184 .…”
Section: Computational Complexity Of Blake2mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note: Many previous Type I boomerang results, such as , can only work on the compression functions ( CF of ) or the keyed permutations ( E of ) rather than the whole hash functions ( HF of ). But for LSH, it is equivalent to attack CF , E and HF due to the absence of the feed forward operation and the linearity of the F I N n finalization function.…”
Section: Boomerang Attacks On Round‐reduced Lsh Hash Functionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because LSH is an ARX hash function family (only using Modular Add “ +”, Rotation “ ” and XOR “⊕”), we can use the XOR difference and deduce the difference linearly by replacing modular adds (“ +”) with the similar XOR (“⊕”). Besides, following the notations of , we present the differential characteristics in the numeric form and denote the zero difference by ϕ .…”
Section: Boomerang Attacks On Round‐reduced Lsh Hash Functionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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