The Boundary Stones of Thought

Rumfitt, Ian

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198733638.001.0001

Cited by 75 publications

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“…Often, these merges feel natural. A recent case is the intuitionistically flavored possibility semantics for classical logic in [15,51]. 22…”

Section: Finding Complementary Analysesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic

Benthem

2018

J Philos Logic

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We identify a pervasive contrast between implicit and explicit stances in logical analysis and system design. Implicit systems change received meanings of logical constants and sometimes also the notion of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary. We illustrate the contrast for intuitionistic and epistemic logic, then take it further to information dynamics, default reasoning, and other areas, to show its wide scope. This gives a working understanding of the contrast, though we stop short of a formal definition, and acknowledge limitations and borderline cases. Throughout we show how awareness of the two stances suggests new logical systems and new issues about translations between implicit and explicit systems, linking up with foundational concerns about identity of logical systems. But we also show how a practical facility with these complementary working styles has philosophical consequences, as it throws doubt on strong philosophical claims made by just taking one design stance and ignoring alternative ones. We will illustrate the latter benefit for the case of logical pluralism and hyper-intensional semantics.

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“…Often, these merges feel natural. A recent case is the intuitionistically flavored possibility semantics for classical logic in [15,51]. 22…”

Section: Finding Complementary Analysesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic

Benthem

2018

J Philos Logic

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“…Sometimes this process can be protracted, and can even involve a whole community of scholars. Following Rumfitt's (, p. 35) usage, we may call this process ‘deduction’. But it is crucial to note that such processes are not processes of adopting or revising any (first order) attitude , and so they are not processes of reasoning in the sense that is relevant here.…”

Section: Is Reasoning a Mental Process?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ryle actually uses the verb ‘deduce’ instead of ‘infer’ here. But it is not clear that ‘deduce’ and ‘infer’ are synonyms – Rumfitt (, pp. 35–6), for one, draws a distinction between them, which I will adopt in Section 4 below.…”

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confidence: 99%

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What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality

Valaris

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Even if you believe just what you rationally ought to believe, you may be open to rational criticism if you do so ‘for the wrong reasons’, as we say. Some have thought that this familiar observation supports the idea that there are diachronic norms of epistemic rationality – namely, norms of good reasoning. Partly drawing upon Carroll's story of Achilles and the Tortoise, this article criticises this line of thought on the grounds that it rests on a mistaken conception of inference.

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“…5 See, e.g., Rumfitt (2015). It should be noted that anti-exceptionalism is a position that is available to the logical pluralist as well (see Hjortland 2017).…”

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Logical anti-exceptionalism and theoretical equivalence

Wigglesworth

2017

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Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logical theories to be continuous with scientific theories. Treating logical theories and scientific theories on a par allows one to provide a justification for logic that is compatible with standard criteria for theory choice in the sciences. But if the anti-exceptionalist position understands logical theories in this way, then it becomes open to more general questions about what logical theories are and when logical theories should be treated as equivalent. Though these are familiar questions that arise in philosophical discussions of scientific theories, they are rarely directed toward logical theories. It is the latter question of theoretical equivalence in logic that this paper addresses. To answer this question, while maintaining the spirit of anti-exceptionalism, one should appeal to standard criteria for theoretical equivalence recognized in the philosophy of science. This paper compares two accepted criteria of equivalence for scientific theories-one syntactic and one semanticin the context of logical anti-exceptionalism, and argues that the syntactic approach leads to undesirable consequences. The anti-exceptionalist should therefore take a semantic approach when evaluating whether logical theories, understood as scientific theories, are equivalent. This paper argues for a particular semantic approach, in terms of categorical equivalence, to determine whether logical theories are equivalent.

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The Boundary Stones of Thought

Cited by 75 publications

References 0 publications

Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic

Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic

What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality

Logical anti-exceptionalism and theoretical equivalence

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